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The Property Clause and
Its Discontents:
Lessons from the
Malheur Occupation
Michael C. Blumm*
Olivier Jamin**
The occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon by a
group of armed militants led by Ammon Bundy during January 2016
spotlighted public land management for a largely oblivious American
public. The militants’ month-long occupation was only the latest of several
armed confrontations in recent years, one of them at Bundy’s father’s ranch in
Nevada. What made the Malheur incident unusual was not only the length of
the occupation but also the claims of the militants that their occupation was
based on constitutional principles. We examine those claims in this Article and
find them meritless, wholly inconsistent with a long line of Supreme Court
interpretations of the plenary federal power to manage federal public lands
under the Property Clause.
Although there is no credible legal case against federal ownership and
management of public lands, the militants and their sympathizers may succeed
in their efforts to divest federal-land management in the political arena,
epitomized by the 2016 Republican Party platform endorsing federal
divestiture. Conveying federal lands to the states, as urged particularly by the
state of Utah, however, would be a recipe for privatizing a common birthright
of all Americans, inconsistent with moral, if not legal obligations to future
generations.
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This land is your land, this land is my land
From California to the New York Island
From the Redwood Forest to the Gulf Stream waters
This land was made for you and me.
This Land is Your Land, Woodie Guthrie, 1940
INTRODUCTION
In early 2016, a group of armed militants seized control of the Malheur
National Wildlife Refuge in southeastern Oregon and occupied the refuge for
some forty-one days.1 Originally a protest against a sentence imposed on
1. The occupiers took over the refuge on January 2, 2016, after a rally for ranchers Dwight and
Stephen Hammond, who were imprisoned for setting fire to federal Bureau of Land Management lands.
The occupation lasted forty-one days, ending on February 11, after the death of one of the protesters,
Robert “LaVoy” Finicum, in a confrontation with the police on January 26. See Conrad Wilson & John
Rosman, Malheur National Wildlife Occupation Ends, OPB NEWS (Feb. 11, 2016, 5:58 PM),
http://www.opb.org/news/series/burns-oregon-standoff-bundy-militia-news-updates/malheuroccupation-ends/.
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federal public-lands grazers,2 the incident quickly devolved into an effort led
by Ammon Bundy to challenge federal ownership of western lands. 3 The
occupation made national news and eventually led the occupiers to jail. 4 Bundy
and his fellow occupiers loudly challenged—without warrant—federal
ownership of land as unconstitutional.5
The Malheur Refuge occupation was not unlike other recent armed
protests over federal land ownership and management. Two years before,
Bundy’s father, Cliven, led armed resistance against attempts to enforce federal
grazing regulations and fees.6 And just a year before the Malheur Refuge
occupation, in southern Oregon’s Rogue River Basin, dredge miners with
federal claims ignored a cease-and-desist order issued by the federal Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) and proceeded with armed resistance.7 A decade
earlier, a confrontation similar to the one at Malheur threatened BLM
employees in southern Arizona, although no violence occurred. 8 The recent rise
of social media, and its ability to marshal numerous anti-government protestors
in short order, may account for the significant increase in the level of resistance
2. Dwight and Steven Hammond set fire to federal lands in 2001 and 2006, allegedly to ward off
invasive plant species and protect their property from wildfire (although perhaps also to cover for an
illegal deer hunt), a crime punishable by a minimum five-year sentence in jail under federal law. See
Alexandra Zavis et al., How Oregon Ranchers Unwittingly Sparked an Armed Standoff, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-hammond-oregon-20160105story.html. After the Hammonds refused to plea-bargain with the U.S. Attorney, the case went to trial—
at which the Hammonds were convicted. At sentencing however, U.S. District Judge Michael Hogan
decided that a five-year sentence would constitute unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.
Consequently, he sentenced Dwight to just three months in jail and Steven to a year. See id. The
government appealed the sentences, and the Ninth Circuit reversed on the grounds the sentences did not
violate the Eighth Amendment, and the district court lacked discretion to alter mandatory minimum
sentences imposed by Congress. See id. This decision effectively sent the Hammonds to federal prison
for five years each. See id.
3. See Les Zaitz, Militia takes over Malheur National Wildlife Refuge headquarters, THE
OREGONIAN (Jan. 2, 2016, 6:15 PM, updated Feb. 22, 2016, 1:29 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/
pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2016/01/drama_in_burns_ends_with_quiet.html.
4. See Press Release, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI Arrests All Remaining Occupiers at
the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/portland/pressreleases/2016/fbi-arrests-all-remaining-occupiers-at-the-malheur-national-wildlife-refuge.
5. See Janell Ross, The Bundys Want Federal Land ‘Returned’ to Them. But it was Never
‘Theirs’ in the First Place, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2016/01/06/the-bundys-want-federal-land-returned-to-them-but-it-was-never-theirs-inthe-first-place/.
6. Les Zaitz, Nevada Rancher Cliven Bundy Arrested by FBI in Portland, THE OREGONIAN (Feb
23, 2016, 1:07 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-standoff/2016/02/nevada_rancher_cliven_
bundy_de.html. Cliven Bundy was finally arrested in Portland earlier this year when planning to join his
sons at the Malheur refuge. Id. He faces weapons charges and a charge of conspiracy to interfere with a
federal officer. Id.
7. See Rob Davis, Months before Malheur Occupation, another Oregon Land Dispute
Galvanized Militants, THE OREGONIAN (Feb. 22, 2016, 2:35 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/oregonstandoff/2016/01/months_before_malheur_occupati.html.
8. See Tim Steller, Nevada Rancher Case has Links to, Parallels in Southern Arizona, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR (Apr. 18, 2014), http://tucson.com/news/local/column/steller-nevada-rancher-case-haslinks-to-parallels-in-southern/article_57029e8f-0bec-5a81-b638-82988fb1e8ea.html.
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a decade later.9 All of these confrontations involved public-land users claiming
that the federal government lacked authority to own and manage federal
lands.10
Some westerners have used state legislation to resist federal land
ownership. For example, in 2012 the state of Utah enacted the Transfer of
Public Lands Act (TPLA), which demanded that the federal government
transfer ownership of most federal land in the state to Utah.11 The state also
threatened to file suit, claiming that the federal government violated its
promises in the Utah Statehood Act to dispose of federal land.12 In 2015
Wyoming passed a statute amending its trespass law to forbid collecting
environmental data on private property, aimed at preventing the collection of
data relevant to water quality problems caused by public-lands cattle grazing.13
And several members of Congress from western states like Utah, Colorado,
Idaho, and Wyoming introduced bills in 2016 that would require divesture of
federal lands by one means or another.14 The Republican Party platform in
2016 even contained a promise to convey federal lands to the states. 15
9. See Lindsey Bever, How the Bundys’ Social Media Machine Fed their Political Movement,
WASH. POST: MORNING MIX (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2016/01/27/how-the-bundys-social-media-machine-fed-their-political-movement/.
10. See Ross, supra note 5 (regarding Bundy’s claim in Oregon); Jaime Fuller, The Long Fight
Between the Bundys and the Federal Government, from 1989 to Today, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Jan. 4,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/15/everything-you-need-to-knowabout-the-long-fight-between-cliven-bundy-and-the-federal-government/ (addressing Bundy’s claim in
Nevada); Davis, supra note 7 (discussing the Galice standoff); Steller, supra note 8 (concerning the
southern Arizona controversy).
11. H.B. 148, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-101104 (West
2014)). Professors Robert Keiter and John Ruple have analyzed the constitutionality of the statute.
Robert B. Keiter & John C. Ruple, Wallace Stegner Ctr. for Land, Resources & the Env’t, A Legal
Analysis of the Transfer of Public Lands Movement 1 (Stegner Center White Paper No. 2014-2, 2014),
http://www.law.indiana.edu/publicland/files/legal_analysis_utah_land_transfer.pdf (concluding that
Utah’s claims will fail because the federal government has plenary control over federal public lands).
12. Utah lawmakers passed legislation establishing a dedicated funding stream for an expected
$14 million lawsuit. See Phil Taylor, Utah Prepares War Chest for Takeover Lawsuit, GREENWIRE
(Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060033874. Utah may base its decision to sue on the
political leanings of the appointee who fills the Supreme Court vacancy left by the late Justice Scalia.
See Michelle L. Price, Lawmaker: Utah Might Not Sue for Federal Lands until 2017, WASH. TIMES
(June 15, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/15/lawmaker-utah-may-not-sue-forfederal-lands-until-/. Transferring management of public lands to states would increase management
costs dramatically. See ROBERT B. KEITER & JOHN C. RUPLE, WALLACE STEGNER CTR. FOR LAND,
RESOURCES & THE ENV’T, THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS MOVEMENT: TAKING THE ‘PUBLIC’ OUT
OF PUBLIC LANDS 1 (Jan. 28, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2555922.
13. WYO. STAT. § 40-27-101 (2015) (the statute prohibits people from using private lands
adjacent to public lands to sample water quality, a technique used to draw conclusions as to the negative
impact of public land grazing on water quality). See Justin Pidot, Forbidden Data: Wyoming Just
Criminalized Citizen Science, SLATE (May 11, 2015, 10:04 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
health_and_science/science/2015/05/wyoming_law_against_data_collection_protecting_ranchers_by_ig
noring_the.html.
14. E.g., State National Forest Management Act of 2015, H.R. 3650, 114th Cong. (2015); SelfSufficient Community Lands Act, H.R. 2316, 114th Cong. (2015); Mount Hood Cooper Spur Land
Exchange Clarification Act, H.R. 3826, 114th Cong. (2016). See Abby Kessler, Land Management Bills
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Efforts to seize control over federal lands have existed at least since the
so-called “Sagebrush Rebellion” of the 1970s16—a response to federal efforts
to reform federal-land management to be more sensitive to wildlife and
watershed protection.17 But when a self-proclaimed sagebrush rebel, Ronald
Reagan, became president, the rebellion subsided.18 A decade-and-a-half later,
the Clinton Administration, under the leadership of Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbitt (a rancher), proposed to reform rangeland regulations, prompting a socalled “County Supremacy Movement.”19 Although that movement bore no
legal fruit,20 it produced numerous unenforceable county ordinances that to this
day proclaim that federal-land ownership within their borders is illegal. 21
Attempts to divest federal ownership of public lands have failed because
for the last 175 years the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed Congress’s
broad authority22 under the Constitution’s Property Clause to establish federal-

Spark Heated Debate, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/
stories/1060033039/search?keyword=Public+lands+bills.
15. See Jodi Peterson, This Year’s GOP Platform Pushes Federal Land Transfers, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (July 14, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/articles/2016-gop-platform-pushes-federal-landtransfers; Scott Streater, Salazar, Hickenlooper Rip ‘Reckless’ GOP Transfer Platform, E&E NEWS PM
(July 19, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2016/07/19/stories/1060040509; see also infra text
accompanying note 313.
16. See GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 72–77 (7th
ed. 2014).
17. See Forty Years of Sagebrush Rebellion, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://www.hcn.org/articles/sagebrush-rebellion. The Hoover Administration offered to convey to
western states the unreserved public lands but withhold the mineral estate, which the states refused. See
George C. Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, “Nothing Beside Remains: The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt’s
Tenure as a Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land and Law Policy, 17 B.C. ENVT’L AFF. L. REV.
473, 492–93 (1990).
18. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 16, at 73.
19. See Gary Andrew Poole, Hold It! This Land Is My Land!: Led by Commissioner Dick Carver,
Nevada’s Nye County Is Now Ground Zero in the West’s War Against the U.S. Government, L. A. TIMES
(Dec. 3, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-12-03/magazine/tm-9835_1_nye-county/6.
20. See, e.g., Gardner v. Stager, 103 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 1996) (barring an action to quiet title to
federal lands and water rights under a Nevada state statute on grounds of federal sovereign immunity);
Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting an argument that a state
water right included an attendant right to graze on public land; thus, cancellation of a federal grazing
lease was not taking of water rights); United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2016)
(rejecting the argument that a rancher had an easement by necessity to cross federal lands due to his
water rights for his cattle to access water sources on federal land).
21. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 321.596–321.599 (2015) (declaring that the state owned and had
control over all “public lands” within it); Baker County, Or., Natural Resources Plan (July 20, 2016);
Grant County, Or., Public Lands Natural Resources Plan (Sept. 30, 2015); Elizabeth M. Osenbaugh &
Nancy K. Stoner, The County Supremacy Movement, 28 URB. LAW. 497, 500–01 (1996); Tay Wiles,
Land Transfer Battles Rage On, County by County, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (July 15, 2016),
https://www.hcn.org/issues/48.12/battles-over-whether-to-support-the-american-lands-council-rage-oncounty-by-county. The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) helps draft such ordinances
and circulates them online. KARLA JONES, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, FEDERALLY MANAGED
LANDS IN THE WEST: THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STATES 15–16
(Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.alec.org/publication/2015federallands/.
22. See infra Part II.C.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817205

Blumm Final Word Doc Headers Whited out3/14/2017 1:12 PM

786

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol.43:781

land policy and to manage public lands.23 This long precedent suggests that no
legal basis exists upon which courts may order such a divestiture,24 despite the
misleading legal advice influencing some of the militants. 25
Political efforts for divesture, however, present other issues, given the
broad power Congress possesses under the Property Clause. Congress may
have the authority to convey public lands to the states or privatize them. 26 In
short, the divestiture of public lands from the federal government is mostly a
political issue, not a legal one.
This Article examines contemporary controversies over federal public
lands, which have now entered a new era—perhaps due to social networking
that encourages armed confrontations—producing considerable threats to both
public employees27 and local communities.28 Part I of the Article discusses the
current controversies and their antecedents. Part II explains the Property Clause
23.
24.

See infra Part II.B.
One law firm in New Orleans, commissioned by the state of Utah, seems to think otherwise.
See George R. Wentz et. al., DAVILLIER LAW GROUP, LLC, LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL
CONSULTING SERVICES TEAM PREPARED FOR THE UTAH COMMISSION FOR THE STEWARDSHIP OF
PUBLIC LANDS 1–5, 145 (Dec. 9, 2015), http://le.utah.gov/interim/2015/pdf/00005590.pdf (suggesting
that under the so-called “equal sovereignty” and “equal footing” doctrines the state may have a case if it
were to expend some $14 million in legal fees). See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text.
25. The Malheur militants were apparently inspired by KrisAnne Hall, a self-proclaimed
constitutional lawyer and Tea Party activist. See KrisAnne Hall, What’s Really Going on in Oregon!
Taking Back the Narrative!, YOUTUBE (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
T424sWq1SkE; see also infra note 248 and accompanying text. Hall has maintained that the federal
government’s only authority to own land is ten square-miles from Washington D.C. Id. She has rejected
the authority of the Supreme Court to judge the constitutionality of laws, maintaining that the seminal
case on which the Supreme Court’s judicial power is based, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), is
just an example of the Supreme Court usurping this power. Id. Her argument that the government’s
authority is limited to 10 square-miles in the District of Columbia is inaccurate even under the Enclave
Clause, the scope of which is much broader. See Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without
Limitation”: The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10–
15 (2001); Marla E. Mansfield, A Primer of Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REV. 801, 804 (1993).
26. The public trust doctrine may provide some limits on the congressional authority to alienate
federal public lands. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust
Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 399 (2015).
27. Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER) tries to protect such employees
by asking agencies to “confront the message, rather than the messenger.” PUB. EMPS. FOR ENVTL. RESP.,
http://www.peer.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
28. In Malheur County, in the wake of the occupation, the local judge (the equivalent of a county
commissioner) who opposed the Bundy militants survived a recall election with over 70 percent of the
vote. See Andrew Selsky, Oregon County Keeps Judge Who Blocked Refuge Occupiers, WASH. TIMES
(June 28, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/28/oregon-recall-election-linked-toarmed-takeover/. During the occupation, Oregonians started a petition to collect monetary pledges in
order to fund the “most appropriate groups to combat the ignorance and hate of the Malheur NWR
occupiers.” By the end of the occupation, the movement, “Go Home Malheur” or #gohomemalheur had
raised more than $135,000. GOHOMEMALHEUR, http://www.gohomemalheur.org/mission/ (last visited
Nov. 15, 2016). The local Burns Paiute Tribe also voiced strong concerns against the occupation,
arguing that “[c]ondoning the illegal occupation of a federal facility by armed lawbreakers only
encourages others to believe they can behave in the same way, with impunity.” Luke Hammill, Burns
Paiute Tribe to Feds: Stop Allowing Bundy Free Passage, THE OREGONIAN (Feb. 22, 2016, 2:51 PM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-standoff/2016/01/burns_paiute_tribe_to_the_feds.html.
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of the Constitution and its consistent judicial interpretation over the centuries,
retracing well-trod legal ground. Part III examines the protestors’ legal claims
against federal ownership of public lands. The claims of these “discontents”
have no plausible credence in light of the long judicial history of consistent
Property Clause interpretation. Part IV explores the political prospects of the
federal-land divestiture movement in Congress, which, given the law explained
in Part II, is where any resolution must occur. The Article concludes that
divestiture threatens to radically alter public-land law and its long history of
preventing land and resource monopolies.29 Given that federal lands have
always been central to American identity, and that divestiture threatens to
engender great opposition and contentious litigation, 30 Congress and the
President should proceed with caution.
I.

BACKGROUND

The incident involving Ammon Bundy and his colleagues at Malheur
Refuge in southeastern Oregon was hardly the first armed protest against
public-land ownership. Just in the twenty-first century, such conflicts occurred
at least five times, in Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and twice in Oregon. In this Part,
we examine some of the most notable confrontations.
A. The Arizona Standoff
In 2002 in southeastern Arizona, the Klump family caused a conflict with
BLM quite similar to the Bundy standoffs. The Klumps claimed ownership of
public lands southeast of the Dos Cabezas Mountains.31 After ten years of
conflict, the federal district court in Tucson ordered Wally Klump to remove
his cattle from the Badger Den and Simmons Peak Allotments. 32 When Klump
refused to recognize BLM’s jurisdiction over his cattle on public lands, federal
officials jailed him until he removed his cows a year later, marking the end of
the dispute.33
The Klump incident resulted from the militants’ misunderstanding of the
Constitution and, like the Bundy affairs, intimidated public servants. Klump
threatened a lethal response to efforts by BLM to remove the cattle, claiming
Second Amendment protection.34 On the other hand, the Klump situation

29. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Kara Tebeau, Antimonopoly in American Public Land
Law, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 155 (2016).
30. See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 26, at 421–30 (discussing possible limits to wholesale
congressional divestiture).
31. See Phil Taylor, Meet the Klumps – BLM’s pre-Bundy Roundup Nightmare, GREENWIRE
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060033470.
32. Id.
33. See Steller, supra note 8.
34. See Taylor, supra note 31. Klump warned BLM, “You take those cows, I’ll kill you as
mandated by the Second Amendment.” Id.
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differed from the Bundy conflicts because after being jailed, Klump stopped
trespassing.35
B. The Bundy Nevada Standoff
Although the Bundy standoff in Nevada captured widespread media
attention in 2014, its origins date from two decades earlier. Cliven Bundy had
stopped paying his grazing fees in the early 1990s, claiming that the federal
government lacked authority over lands that his ancestors settled in the
1880s.36 BLM filed suit against Bundy, and a federal district court ruled in
favor of BLM in 1998.37 Over the years, BLM tried to settle Bundy’s unpaid
grazing fees, which eventually amounted to over $1.2 million, but its efforts
were unsuccessful.38
The conflict intensified in 2014 when footage of a BLM agent using a stun
gun on Bundy’s son went viral on the Internet, and hundreds of armed militants
came to Bundy’s ranch to help defend him from the court order.39 The standoff
culminated in April 2014, when Bundy led his followers to retake the cattle that
BLM had confiscated, resulting in more than four hundred armed followers
confronting about fifty government agents.40 Faced with a threat of armed
conflict, BLM backed down and returned some of the cattle, while proceeding
with administrative and judicial actions against Bundy. 41
Later, Bundy offered two defenses in court. First, he alleged that the land
in question belonged to either Nevada or the local county. 42 Second, he argued
that his ancestral use right preempted BLM’s jurisdiction over federal land,
denying the sovereignty of the federal government.43 He even claimed that the
Supreme Court had no authority to interpret law, and that the decisions of the
35. Compare Taylor, supra note 31, with Matt Ford, The Irony of Cliven Bundy’s
Unconstitutional Stand, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2014/04/the-irony-of-cliven-bundys-unconstitutional-stand/360587/ (Klump did not acknowledge
Arizona state laws, whereas Bundy claimed to act consistent with Nevada law).
36. Matt Ford, The Irony of Cliven Bundy’s Unconstitutional Stand, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 14,
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/the-irony-of-cliven-bundys-unconstitutionalstand/360587/.
37. United States v. Bundy, No. CV-S-98-531-JBR (RJJ), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23835, at *19
(D. Nev. Nov. 4, 1998).
38. See Ford, supra note 36.
39. See id.
40. See Julie Turkewitz, Cliven Bundy and Sons Charged in Case That Gave Rise to Oregon
Standoff, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/us/charges-for-5-in-nevadaare-linked-to-oregon-case.html; see Ford, supra note 36 (one of the anti-government militants told
Reuters “I’m ready to pull the trigger if fired upon . . . .”).
41. Jim Urquhart, U.S. Officials End Stand-Off with Nevada Rancher Cliven Bundy, NEWSWEEK
(Apr. 12, 2014, 10:50 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/us-officials-end-stand-nevada-rancher-clivenbundy-246038.
42. United States v. Bundy, No. CV-S-98-531-JBR (RJJ), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23835, at *4,
12–13 (D. Nev. Nov. 4, 1998).
43. Id.; Bundy did pledge allegiance to state laws. See Ford, supra note 36 (“I abide by all of
Nevada state laws. But I don’t recognize the United States government as even existing.”).
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Court could not bind any state.44 Consequently, he flatly rejected all of the
Property Clause’s jurisprudence concerning federal authority over public
lands.45
Although Cliven Bundy’s argument failed in court, many ranchers
celebrated his “[teaching] the federal government a lesson” and getting BLM to
back down.46 That “victory,” however, came at a price, as more militants
involved in the armed standoff have since faced indictment and jail time.47
Bundy’s legal prospects are dim48—even the Nevada Constitution, which
expressly recognizes the supremacy of the federal government and of the
Supreme Court,49 conflicts with his argument. But Bundy has enjoyed some
political momentum, including the backing of several Republican politicians.50
While Cliven Bundy remained in Nevada, his son, Ammon, became the leading
figure in the Malheur Refuge occupation.
C. The Utah Transfer of Public Lands Act
In 2012 state representative Ken Ivory of Utah sponsored a bill to transfer
public lands to the state.51 The TPLA demanded that the United States
government gift the state over 30 million acres of public lands by December 31,
2014.52 The TPLA resulted from growing state frustration over federal land
ownership and management in Utah, where the federal government owns
44. Bundy claimed that the Constitution did not authorize the Supreme Court to exercise judicial
review, echoing the argument of Hall, supra note 25, against the legitimacy of the foundational case
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1805), and asserting that the Court exceeded its constitutional
authority in that decision.
45. See infra Part II.
46. See Adam Nagourney, A Defiant Rancher Savors the Audience That Rallied to His Side, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/us/politics/rancher-proudly-breaks-thelaw-becoming-a-hero-in-the-west.html?_r=1.
47. See Phil Taylor, Trump Ally Arrested; 14 More Indicted for Bundy’s Nev. Siege, E&ENEWS
(Mar. 3, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060033433.
48. See infra Part II.B.; see also Conrad Wilson, Judge Denies Release for Bundy Brothers Again,
OPB NEWS (July 19, 2016, 5:04 PM), http://www.opb.org/news/series/burns-oregon-standoff-bundymilitia-news-updates/ammon-ryan-bundy-denied-release-again/.
49. See NEV. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“[T]he Paramount Allegiance of every citizen is due to the
Federal Government in the exercise of all its Constitutional powers as the same have been or may be
defined by the Supreme Court of the United States”).
50. Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) voiced support for the Bundys, as did Sen. Dean Heller (R-Nev.),
who called Cliven Bundy’s supporters “patriots.” See Nagourney, supra note 46. Former presidential
candidate Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) made clear his intention to give away or sell public lands to the states.
See Ralph Maughan, Cruz Tries to Win the West by Taking our Public Lands, WILDLIFE NEWS (Apr. 9,
2015),
http://www.thewildlifenews.com/2015/04/09/cruz-tries-to-win-the-west-by-taking-our-publiclands/. There are groups in many western states, including New Mexico, Colorado, Idaho, and Utah,
calling for the transfer of public lands to the states. See Paul Tolmé, Keeping Public Lands Public,
NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.nwf.org/News-and-Magazines/National-Wildlife/
Animals/Archives/2016/Keeping-Public-Lands-Public.aspx.
51. Transfer of Public Lands Act and Related Study, H.B. 148, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah) (codified
at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-101–104 (West 2014)). The 2016 Republican Platform endorsed
conveying federal lands to the states. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
52. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-6-103(1) (West 2014); Keiter & Ruple, supra note 11, at 1.
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roughly 65 percent of the land surface.53 Utah became the first state to pass a
law demanding the federal government hand over lands to the state.54 The
Act’s deadline for the transfer expired at the end of 2014 without inducing
federal action, so state Republicans are now pressing to sue the federal
government to claim the federal acres. The state seeks to secure the lands for
mineral development and timber production.55
Although the TPLA conflicts with congressional authority under the
Property Clause to manage public lands,56 supporters of the Act make three
arguments in support of its constitutionality.57 First, they allege that the text of
the Utah Enabling Act demonstrates that both the federal government and the
state intended the Act to commit Congress to dispose of public lands in Utah.58
Second, they argue that the history of management of western lands shows
federal intent to eventually cede all lands to the states. 59 Third, they claim that
53.
54.

See Keiter & Ruple, supra note 11, at 1.
Jack Healy & Kirk Johnson, The Larger, but Quieter than Bundy, Push to Take Over Federal
Land, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/us/the-larger-but-quieter-thanbundy-push-to-take-over-federal-land.html. ALEC, supra note 21, helped transfer advocates in drafting
similar bills in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Washington, and Wyoming, but no
bill has been enacted. See Rachael Bale, The Problems with the State Movement to Take Federal Land,
CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING: REVEAL (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.revealnews.org/article/theproblems-with-the-state-movement-to-take-federal-land/.
55. See Healy & Johnson, supra note 54.
56. See Nick Lawton, Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act: Demanding a Gift of Federal Lands,
16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 17 (2014). In cases of conflict between state and federal law, the federal law
prevails under the Supremacy Clause. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
57. See Lawton, supra note 56, at 18–21.
58. See id. at 19. Section III of the Utah Enabling Act provides that the people of Utah
[A]gree that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying
within the boundaries thereof; and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any
Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the
United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States.
Utah Enabling Act, §3, 28 Stat. 107 (1894). Proponents of transfer argue that the so called “disclaimer”
requires the United States to extinguish title to public lands, which the United States has failed to do. See
Lawton, supra note 56, at 18. Professors Keiter and Ruple explain why the argument is flawed,
however. See Keiter & Ruple, supra note 11, at 5 (“‘[S]hall’ in an enabling act indicates that at some
future date, the federal government may sell public lands. If [it] does sell more land, five-percent of the
proceeds would go to the state, but the Utah Enabling Act does not obligate the federal government to
dispose of federal lands. Moreover, even if shall is interpreted as a term of obligation, at the turn of the
19th century, ‘shall’ meant ‘[m]ay, when used against a government.’”).
59. See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, A Legal Overview of Utah’s H.B. 148—The Transfer of Public
Lands Act 14–18, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 2013), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/alegal-overviewof-utahs-hb-148 (“It can not [sic] be supposed the compacts intended that the United
States should retain forever a title to lands within the States which are of no value, and no doubt is
entertained that the general interest would be best promoted by surrendering such lands to the States.”
(quoting President Andrew Jackson, Veto Message of December 4, 1833, reprinted in 3 Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, at 56-69, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=67041)). Professor Kochan’s report claimed that there were “serious legal questions” raised by
Utah’s demand that the federal government gift it some 20 million acres of federal public land, Kochan,
supra, at 5. However, there are serious flaws in several of his arguments: (1) he claimed that it would be
“impracticable” to believe that the state would disclaim any interference with federal land management
without a corresponding obligation to dispose of federal lands, id. at 13, but the federal government did
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the Supreme Court’s 1845 decision in Pollard v. Hagan60 means that the
federal government may own land only for the benefit of new states, rejecting
the Supreme Court’s contrary interpretations of the Property Clause.61
However, the Utah Enabling Act’s express requirement that the state “forever
disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands”62 within its
territory, represents the most persuasive evidence of the appropriate federal and
state roles in future land management. Moreover, the Supreme Court clearly
confined its holding in Pollard to submerged lands beneath navigable waters.63
Utah’s claims are consequently unlikely to succeed.64
Utah’s efforts to obtain title to public lands constitute just one example of
multiple bills introduced in western states for similar claims. Most of the other
efforts rely on political, not legal arguments,65 as these efforts represent a
broader attempt to gather support to lobby Congress to gift federal lands to the
states. This approach has a better chance of success than any legal claim. 66

in fact dispose of over seven million acres of land to the state in its Statehood Act and many more to
private parties over the years, and the chief consideration for the state to join the Union was political
equal footing, not proprietary benefits; (2) he mistakenly referred to the federal government as acquiring
land through statehood, id. at 14, when it actually obtained the lands through the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo of 1848 with Mexico, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mex.-U.S., Feb. 2 1848, 9 Stat. 922; (3) he
alleged that if the federal government failed to sell its land, the state would not receive its “anticipated
percentage” of 5 percent, Kochan, supra, at 15, but a failure to sell would not affect the disposition of
revenues from the lands that were not sold; and (4) he maintained that failure to dispose conflicted with
an “ethic” or “expectation” of disposal, id. at 16, but there’s no language in the Statehood Act that could
be interpreted as creating any vested rights in a particular number of acres the federal government must
dispose.
60. 44 U.S. 212 (1845) (holding that statehood implicitly transferred tidelands in navigable
Mobile Bay to the state).
61. See Lawton, supra note 56, at 20–21.
62. Utah Enabling Act §3, 28 Stat. 107 (1894).
63. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 230; United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 36 (1947) (refusing to apply
the Pollard reasoning to lands submerged beneath ocean waters); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
597–98 (1963) (rejecting state arguments to apply Pollard to federal public lands not submerged beneath
navigable waters at statehood). See infra notes 275–277 and accompanying text.
64. See Keiter & Ruple, supra note 11, at 6 (“The federal government has absolute control over
federal public lands, including the constitutional authority to retain lands in federal ownership.”). Rep.
Bishop will not let his big bargain go down easily, however, as an updated bill he introduced in July
2016 demonstrated. See Thomas Burr & Matt Canham, Bishop, Chaffetz Unveil Long-Awaited Lands
Bill in Bid to Block a Bears Ears National Monument, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 16, 2016, 5:47 PM),
http://www.sltrib.com/home/4116187-155/bishop-chaffetz-unveil-long-awaited-lands-bill.
65. See the congressional and political support mentioned supra notes 50-51.
66. See Part IV. After this Article was in press, the Associated Press obtained through the
Freedom of Information Act a report of the Western Attorneys General, which agreed that (1) the
Property Clause gives the federal government plenary authority to dispose of or reserve public lands at
its discretion; (2) the Enclave Clause does not limit the scope of the Property Clause; and (3) neither the
equal footing nor equal sovereignty arguments, proffered by the New Orleans law firm for the state of
Utah, supra note 24, required federal disposition of public lands. W. ATT’YS GEN. LITIG. ACTION
COMMITTEE, CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, REPORT OF THE PUBLIC LANDS
SUBCOMMITTEE
(2016), https://wilderness.org/sites/default/files/CWAG%20Public%20Lands%20
Subcommittee%20Report.pdf [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT]. The report was approved
on an 11-1 vote on July 19, 2016. Id. at i. See Scott Streater, States Lack Standing to Seize Federal
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D. The Galice Mining Standoff–Rogue River
The Malheur Refuge occupation was not the first armed resistance to
federal land management in Oregon. A similar standoff began in April 2015
when two gold miners in the Galice mining district received a non-compliance
letter from BLM disputing their mining rights to the Sugar Pine Mine in
southwestern Oregon.67 To defend his alleged mining right, Rick Barclay asked
the Oath Keepers of Josephine County for help, prompting numerous armed
protesters to arrive and watch over the claim for six weeks. 68
Although BLM closed its office for a day because of threatening phone
calls, the Galice standoff appeared more peaceable than the Malheur Refuge
occupation.69 The armed conflict ended when the Interior Board of Land
Appeals agreed to hear the miners’ administrative appeal, which remains
ongoing as of this writing.70 The miners challenged BLM’s authority to
manage surface rights, contending that the claims dated back to the 1870s, long
before the 1955 Surface Resources Act directed federal land managers to
protect surface resources affected by mining.71 BLM maintained that it
possessed surface rights authorizing the agency to regulate the mining claims.72
Unlike Bundy’s meritless ownership claim at the Malheur Refuge occupation,
the Galice miners may have a credible legal argument concerning BLM’s
jurisdiction over their mining claims.

Acres—AGs, GREENWIRE (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060043768 (citing
and linking to the attorneys general’s report).
67. See Davis, supra note 7 (explaining that a federal employee surveying the land for abandoned
mines found impermissible equipment on site near Galice because the miners had no surface rights; the
employee told Rick Barclay and George Backes that they needed to obtain federal approval before
mining).
68. See id.
69. The Josephine County Sheriff compared the two incidents in the following terms: “[w]hat you
had in Sugar Pine was a peaceful, fairly well-organized event” . . . [w]hat you have over there [at
Malheur Refuge] is truly an armed occupation where laws are being broken.” Id.
70. The Interior Board of Land Appeals ordered BLM not to enforce its order to stop mining, and
the miners promised to stop mining during the administrative appeal process. Barclay proceeded to file
suit in federal court in October 2015 to restore his rights to mine, and oral arguments were heard in
February 2016. See Mark Freeman, Miners Defiant as Dredging Moratorium Begins, WASH. TIMES
(Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/15/miners-defiant-as-dredgingmoratorium-begins/?page=all.
71. See Travis Gettys, Militia Groups Flock to Oregon for Bundy-Style Standoff with
‘Government Jackboots’ over Gold Mining Claims, RAW STORY (Apr. 14, 2015, 12:28 PM),
http://www.rawstory.com/2015/04/militia-groups-flock-to-oregon-for-bundy-style-standoff-withgovernment-jackboots-over-gold-mining-claim/.
72. See Judge Bars BLM Enforcement in Oregon Gold Mine Dispute, THE OREGONIAN (May 20,
2015,
4:45
PM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2015/05/judge_bars_blm_
enforcement_in.html.
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E. The Malheur Refuge Occupation
The Malheur Refuge occupation lasted six weeks and resulted in the arrest
of at least twenty-five militants.73 The leading figure of the occupation,
Ammon Bundy was not an Oregon landowner, but he seized the opportunity
provided by the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the Hammonds’ sentences74 to
advocate the Bundian interpretation of the Constitution and its public-land
ramifications. Ironically, BLM and the local community had collaborated well
over the years and had reached agreement in 2013 on a refuge management
plan affecting grazing and wildlife and watershed protection. 75 Although the
local population had expressed mixed feelings about the presence of the Bundy
militants,76 Bundy used the occupation to repeatedly declare federal land
ownership unconstitutional, and BLM powerless to manage federal lands.77
73. See Conrad Wilson, Judge: Malheur Occupation Trial Could Take More Than a Month, OPB
NEWS, Mar. 9 2016, 10:19 PM), http://www.opb.org/news/series/burns-oregon-standoff-bundy-militianews-updates/judge-malheur-trial-could-take-more-than-a-month/. Ammon and Ryan Bundy argued in
their federal court trial in Portland, Oregon, that the federal government lost the power to regulate public
lands after Oregon achieved statehood. See Nevada Trial for Cliven Bundy, 18 Others Set for 2017, THE
OREGONIAN (Apr. 27, 2016, 2:36 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/
2016/04/nevada_trial_for_cliven_bundy.html. The Bundys maintained that their actions at the refuge
aimed to establish an adverse possession claim over the Refuge, and that free speech protected their
conduct. See Maxine Bernstein, Bundy Brothers’ Motion for Pretrial Release Previews their Defense in
Oregon Standoff Case, THE OREGONIAN, (July 18, 2016, 5:06 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/
portland/index.ssf/2016/07/ammon_bundys_motion_for_pretri.html#incart_river_home. The number of
defendants who went to trial in September 2016 was just seven, as many of the original defendants
pleaded guilty, and others will face later proceedings. See Maxine Bernstein, Trial for Ammon Bundy, 6
Others in Oregon Standoff Set to Begin, THE OREGONIAN (Sept. 8, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://www.oregon
live.com/oregon-standoff/2016/09/oregon_standoff_trial_for_ammo.html. In a surprising decision, given
the relatively undisputed facts, the jury acquitted all seven defendants. See Postscript, infra.
74. See Zavis et al., supra note 2.
75. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MALHEUR NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE: COMPREHENSIVE
CONSERVATION PLAN (2013), https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/malheur-national-wildlife-refugecomprehensive-conservation-plan.
76. Oregonians started a petition to collect pledges in order to fund the “most appropriate groups
to combat the ignorance and hate of the Malheur NWR occupiers.” By the end of the occupation, the
movement, “Go Home Malheur” or #gohomemalheur had raised more than $135,000.
GOHOMEMALHEUR, supra note 28. The local Burns Paiute Tribe also voiced strong concerns against the
occupation, arguing that “[c]ondoning the illegal occupation of a federal facility by armed lawbreakers
only encourages others to believe they can behave in the same way, with impunity.” Hammill, supra
note 28. Harney County Judge Steve Grasty, who opposed the Bundy occupation, survived a recall
election, with voters overwhelmingly (some 70 percent) rejecting the recall. See Selsky, supra note 28.
On the other hand, some locals “have welcomed the occupation and the attention it has brought to local
frustration over the management of federal lands.” See Amelia Templeton, Oregon Occupation Sheds
Light on Local Frustrations, But Divides Residents, NPR (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.npr.org/
2016/01/05/462052656/oregon-standoff-sheds-light-on-local-frustrations-but-divides-residents
(last
visited Dec. 15, 2016).
77. Bundy’s reading of the Constitution reflects the views of Cleon Skousen, a far-right political
thinker. See Betsy Gaines Quammen, The War for the West Rages On, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/30/opinion/the-war-for-the-west-rages-on.html?_r=0. Cleon Skousen
was an “exemplar of the right-wing ultras;” his interpretation of the Constitution was that the Founders
sought to establish a Christian Nation, with a Christian God, and “never intended the federal government
to have any power over its people.” See Nigel Duara, Oregon Armed Protesters Invoke the Constitution
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Although the occupation provided Bundy with a broader platform for his
message, he risked a lengthy prison term.78 However, the intense media
coverage of the Malheur Refuge occupation may have buoyed the political
momentum for Bundy’s cause.79 Whatever his political prospects may be,
Bundy’s legal claims are completely unfounded, as the next Parts demonstrate.
II.

THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AND ITS INTERPRETATION

This Part discusses the origins of the Property Clause and analyzes its
interpretation by both the Supreme Court and Congress. The first subpart
explains that the Property Clause ratified the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
which aimed, among other things, to give the federal government control over
western settlement, at least in the area north of the Ohio River. The second
subpart discusses the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting federal power
under the Property Clause, which the Court consistently held to be “without
limitation.” The third subpart provides examples of how Congress has used its
broad Property Clause powers to manage federal lands.
A. The Northwest Ordinance
The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, the most significant legislation enacted by
the Confederation Congress, passed with near unanimity, reflecting general
agreement as to how the federal government should manage the western lands
ceded to it by the states.80 Although the ordinance ratified federal control of the

– Annotated by a Conspiracy Theorist, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016, 6:27 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-ff-oregon-standoff-constitution-20160121-story.html. Skousen relied on quotations from
the Founders, either deliberately altered or taken out of context, to illustrate the need for people to take
power for themselves and exclude the government from their affairs. See id.
78. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. If convicted, Bundy could have faced between
six years and two decades in prison. See Sara Roth, What to Know Before the Oregon Occupation Trial
Begins, KGW (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.kgw.com/news/investigations/bundy-occupation-trial-inseptember-what-to-expect/312650362. Although the law was clearly against them, the Bundys avoided
conviction because of “unpredictable juries.” See Jeremy P. Jacobs, Why Bundy Convictions are No
Slam Dunk: Unpredictable Juries, GREENWIRE (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/
2016/10/11/stories/1060044089 (explaining that “[a]ttorneys who have experience trying cases in
Western states have found juries notoriously unpredictable and hard to read in trials involving public
lands and property rights”). Jacobs’ predictions turned out to be true as the jury acquitted all seven
defendants on October 27, 2016. See Postscript, infra.
79. Public land management became an issue in the presidential election of 2016. See, e.g., Rocky
Barker, GOP Candidates Divided Over Public Land in Idaho, West, IDAHO STATESMAN (Feb. 19, 2016,
2:20 PM), http://www.idahostatesman.com/news/politics-government/election/article61349767.html;
see also Peterson, supra note 15 (discussing the 2016 Republican Platform provision to convey federal
lands to the states).
80. See Matthew J. Festa, Property and Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST.
L. J. 409, 427 (2014) (explaining the federal government’s acceptance of the first state land cessions in
the 1780s). New York was first in 1782; Virginia in 1784; Massachusetts in 1785; and Connecticut in
1786. See NORMAN K. RISJORD, JEFFERSON’S AMERICA: 1760-1815, at 200–01 (3d ed. 2009). The day
that Virginia ceded its claims, Thomas Jefferson, chair of a committee deciding the issue of the western
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western settlements, the statute also prohibited slavery, 81 established a process
to admit new states to the Union “on an equal footing,”82 anticipated federalland sales to repay the Revolutionary War debt,83 and called for good-faith
dealings with local Indian tribes and protection of native property rights. 84
Throughout its text, the statute exhibited anti-colonial and anti-monarchial
sentiments, reflecting Thomas Jefferson’s ideals.85 The legislation aimed to
promote both widespread land ownership and participation in civic life,86
consistent with Jeffersonian notions about property. 87 These anti-monopolistic
ideas inspired the Property , Contract, Takings, and Due Process Clauses of the
U.S. Constitution, all of which are traceable to the Northwest Ordinance.88
Before 1784, conflicts with Native Americans impeded settlement of
western lands and made for an unstable western frontier. Alexander Hamilton
ingeniously proposed that the federal government assume the states’
considerable Revolutionary War debts if the states with western claims (about
half the original states) ceded their claims to the federal government. 89 After
the states largely ratified that deal,90 the new federal government prioritized the
cession of state claims to western lands. New York became the first state to
cede title to its claims in 1782, and Virginia came next in 1784.91 The rest of

territories, submitted the first draft of what would become the Northwest Ordinance. See JAY A.
BARRETT, EVOLUTION OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787, at 17–18 (1891).
81. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, art. VI, reprinted in 1 U.S.C.
LVII (2012) [hereinafter Northwest Ordinance].
82. Northwest Ordinance, art. V.
83. See Festa, supra note 80, at 412.
84. Northwest Ordinance, art. III.
85. See Blumm & Tebeau, supra note 29, at 163–65. Anti-monarchial sentiments fueled AntiFederalist concern over widespread federal ownership of Western lands as a source of wealth
independent of taxpayer control. See Carol M. Rose, Claiming While Complaining on the Federal
Public Lands: A Problem for Public Property or a Special Case?, 104 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 95, 107-11
(2015) (suggesting that this sentiment was a legacy of the English Civil War and King Charles I’s efforts
to evade parliamentary control, later dismissed by Joseph Story as inapplicable to a republic like the
United States).
86. See Festa, supra note 80, at 432.
87. See id. at 442. Jefferson was in fact a principal drafter of the initial ordinance, which the
Confederation Congress first enacted in 1784. See id.; LIBR. OF CONGRESS, PRINTED RESOLUTION ON
W. TERRITORY GOV’T; WITH NOTATIONS BY THOMAS JEFFERSON (1784), https://www.loc.gov/
item/mtjbib000873/.
88. See Festa, supra note 80, at 416.
89. Although the Revolutionary War debt was with the individual states (whose uncertain funding
undermined the war effort), in 1790 Alexander Hamilton convinced Congress to assume the remaining
debt. His idea was that the federal government would finance the debt largely through public-land sales.
See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 176–77 (2004); Paul W. Gates, An Overview of American
Land Policy, 50 AGRIC. POL’Y 213, 217 (1976).
90. See JOSEPH ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 73–74 (2002).
91. See PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL
CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES 104 (1983); see also 26 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 90
(Feb. 23, 1784), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field%28DOCID+@lit%28jc02
648%29%29.
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the states with western-land claims followed.92 The federal government
followed the plan codified in the Northwest Ordinance, and created new
republican settlements in the West that eventually became new states, entering
the union “on equal footing with the said original states.”93 The focus on
equality reflected the anti-colonial sentiment widespread in Revolutionary
America.
1. Managing Western Settlements
The Northwest Ordinance established a framework of surveying and then
selling the western lands in an orderly fashion, providing security for individual
property rights recognized by the federal government and financing the war
debt.94 The ordinance provided the government with the ability to manage and
dispose of lands for the public benefit. Once in possession of western lands, the
United States government sold them to settle its Revolutionary War debts.95 As
owner and manager of these lands, the federal government also resolved some
of the conflicts animating the West by giving settlers the security of legally
recognized title96 and working with the Native Americans to minimize the risks
of war by pledging “good faith” toward them and security for their “property,
rights and liberty.”97
The Northwest Ordinance also introduced the concept of compensation for
government takings of private land. Article II of the ordinance provided:
“[S]hould the public exigencies make it necessary, for the common
preservation, to take any person’s property, or to demand his particular
services, full compensation shall be made for the same.”98 The ordinance’s
recognition of the federal eminent domain power shows that even after selling
lands to settlers, the government retained the ability to take private land for
92. The so-called “landed” states had a great potential advantage over the six “landless” states:
the sale of western lands would enrich the landed states, while the landless states feared they would lose
residents and significance. Most states quickly followed the example of New York and Virginia, two of
the largest states. But Georgia did not cede its western lands until 1802, twelve years after all the other
states. See Onuf, supra note 91, at 104–05. And Connecticut, while ceding the rest of its claims, did not
cede its Western Reserve in Ohio until 1800. Festa, supra note 80, at 429 n.118.
93. Northwest Ordinance, art. V (“[W]henever any of the said states shall have sixty thousand
free inhabitants therein, such state shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the United
States, on an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever”).
94. See PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
31, 33 (1987).
95. By 1795, the U.S. government no longer owed money to foreign governments. U.S. Debt and
Foreign Loans, 1775–1795, in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.
0state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/loans (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
96. See Robert S. Hill, Federalism, Republicanism, and the Northwest Ordinance, 18 PUBLIUS
41, 51–52 (1988).
97. Northwest Ordinance, art. III. See Festa, supra note 80, at 428, 434. Under the Indian
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-33,
§ 4, 1 Stat. 137 (1790), the federal government had exclusive authority to negotiate treaties with Indian
tribes.
98. Northwest Ordinance, art. II.
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public use upon providing just compensation. Thus, as early as 1787, the
federal government announced its sovereign authority over private lands as
well as declaring that it would use its proprietary power over public lands for
the benefit of the public.
The Northwest Ordinance created a legal and political framework aimed at
promoting the economic and social development of the West.99 Reflecting
antimonopoly sentiment, the ordinance sought to spread land ownership among
a large number of settlers. Widespread land ownership created an incentive to
participate in political life as a citizen.100 By providing security of land title, the
ordinance sought to invest settlers in the development of stable communities.
Finally, Article IV of the Northwest Ordinance required new states
admitted to the Union to not interfere with the disposal of land by the United
States or with the title to land granted to bona fide purchasers.101 This promise
of non-interference with federal management reflected federal supremacy over
state rules concerning public land and promoted security for individuals who
purchased lands from the government.102
2. Prohibiting Slavery in the Northwest
Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance declared that “[t]here shall be
neither Slavery nor involuntary Servitude in the said territory,” 103 a provision
reflecting the federal government’s broad authority to enact laws regulating the
lands it owned and to control the disposition of private property rights.
Later, the text of the Property Clause and the cases interpreting it
reiterated and amplified this power. Abolishing slavery north of the Ohio River
was a republican idea.104 Prohibiting slavery had important effects on property
rights, not merely affecting existing landowners’ property rights in the
Northwest, but also effectively precluding large, slave-owning plantation
owners from moving to the Northwest. The Northwest Ordinance instead
favored widespread distribution of property among smaller, independent
farmers.105 By disfavoring large plantation owners, the ordinance reflected the
99. See Peter S. Onuf, Liberty, Development, and Union: Visions of the West in the 1780s, 43
WM. & MARY Q. 179, 181 (1986).
100. See WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY
AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 191–92 (2001).
101. Northwest Ordinance, art. IV.
102. See Festa, supra note 80, at 437. The ordinance was in part a response to the Shays’ Rebellion
of 1786, which raised questions about the ability of a republican government to provide “an ordered
society that would provide security for liberty and property to the yeoman settlers.” The ordinance
aimed to protect both personal and land rights and, in so doing, root “republicanism in the habits of the
people.” See Hill, supra note 96, at 52.
103. Northwest Ordinance, art. VI.
104. See Festa, supra note 80, at 458 (abolishing slavery was part of the “larger republican vision
for the new territory”).
105. See supra text following note 99 and accompanying note 100; David Brion Davis, The
Significance of Excluding Slavery from the Old Northwest in 1787, 84 IND. MAG. OF HIST. 75, 88–89
(1988).
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Framers’ disapproval of colonial governments’ practice of awarding land
monopolies.106
3. Reducing Inequalities Among States
The Northwest Ordinance called for the admission of new states on “equal
footing,” conditioned on the guarantee of a republican form of government.107
Combined with several modifications of property rights that the ordinance
implemented,108 its equal-footing doctrine meant that western lands were the
property of the United States, but the federal government would not treat the
territories as colonies.109 Instead, the federal government would act as a trustee
and ensure that new states admitted to the Union possessed the same sovereign
attributes of the original thirteen states.110
This trust concept later became important in Supreme Court interpretation
of the so-called equal footing cases, extending from Pollard v. Hagan in
1845111 to Arizona v. California in 1963112 to Idaho v. United States in
2001.113 The Court also used trust language to interpret the Property Clause, as
in Light v. United States,114 where the Court ratified the notion that the federal
government manages public lands as a sovereign with a trust obligation to the
public.115
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Property Clause
Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Property Clause
infrequently but consistently. With nearly no exception, the Court has ruled that

106. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1257–58, 1278–79 (1996) (awarding land monopolies favored economic
elites; by favoring widespread ownership of lands, however, the Framers sought to diminish the power
of elites by offering great numbers of people the opportunities to own lands and to participate in political
life).
107. See ONUF, supra note 94, at 58–59.
108. The Northwest Ordinance established an intestacy scheme that promoted greater equality and
encouraged wider distribution of property among citizens. See Festa, supra note 80, at 439. By
increasing the number of property owners, the ordinance also created more stakeholders in the political
process by giving them the right to participate in political life. See id. at 440. The ordinance also
facilitated the free alienability of real and personal property through voluntary transfer, another
important property rule. Northwest Ordinance, art. II.
109. See Festa, supra note 80, at 460.
110. See id.
111. 44 U.S. 212 (1845) (statehood implicitly conveyed to the states title to lands submerged
beneath navigable waters at statehood).
112. 373 U.S. 546, 597–98 (1963) (statehood did not implicitly convey federal public uplands to
the states).
113. 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (upholding a federal pre-statehood reservation of lands to the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe).
114. 220 U.S. 523 (1911) (upholding the Forest Service’s authority to require permits and fees on
national forest lands).
115. Id. at 537.
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the federal power under the Property Clause is “without limitation.” 116 This
subpart briefly explains this Property Clause case law.117
1. Disposing of Federal Lands
The Supreme Court’s first Property Clause decision concerned a challenge
to an 1807 federal statute authorizing the President to lease lead mines on
federally owned lands in what became the state of Illinois in 1818.118
Assuming a position remarkably similar to modern Sagebrush Rebels,119 John
Gratiot argued that Congress possessed authority only to dispose of public
lands and make “needful rules and regulations” respecting the preparation of
116. See, e.g., United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840); Light, 220 U.S. at 537; United
States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940). The only exception to the broad interpretation of
the Property Clause came in the most reviled Supreme Court decision in constitutional history, Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), which helped to bring on the Civil War. Scott sued his master to
gain his freedom and, after trial, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected his claim for freedom based on his
earlier residences in free states and territories. Id. at 398, 431–32. Scott then attempted to collaterally
attack that decision in federal court, which rejected his attempt to establish diversity jurisdiction. Id. at
400. The Supreme Court surprisingly accepted certiorari and affirmed. See id. at 454. Justice Taney’s
opinion for a divided Court relied on the Framers’ intent to conclude that Scott, as an African-American,
was not a citizen of any state, thus denying him the ability to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction. Id. at
403–29. Although Taney proceeded to examine the Property Clause and conclude that Congress lacked
the authority to establish rules for federal territories in the West that were not in the Union at the time of
the Constitution, id. at 432–52, that part of the opinion was obiter dicta and not clearly the opinion of a
majority of the Court (there were seven opinions in the case). The Supreme Court has never relied on the
Property Clause portion of Justice Taney’s opinion in any subsequent Supreme Court decision.
117. For a comprehensive analysis of the Supreme Court’s Property Clause jurisprudence, see
Appel, supra note 25.
118. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526. The 1807 statute calling for leasing of lead mines was not the first time
the federal government reserved federal lands. For example, in 1785 and 1786, federal treaties with the
Cherokee, Choctaw, and Creek tribes recognized Indian land reservations. Treaty with the Cherokee,
Cherokee-U.S., Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18; Treaty with the Choctaw, Choctaw-U.S., Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat.
21, Treaty with the Chickasaw, Chickasaw-U.S., Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24. And although the first large
non-Indian land reservation is often thought to the Yellowstone reservation in 1872, actually the
government reserved the lands which would become Hot Springs National Park in Arkansas in 1832,
eight years before the Supreme Court affirmed the lead mines leasing legislation in its 1840 decision in
Gratiot. See Sharon Shugart, Dep’t of the Interior, Nat’l Park Service, The Hot Springs of Arkansas
Through the Years: A Chronology of Events 3, 5 (2004), https://web.archive.org/
web/20150401131042/http://www.nps.gov/hosp/learn/historyculture/upload/chronology.web.pdf
(explaining that President Andrew Jackson reserved the area in 1832, well before it became a National
Park in 1921). All of these land reservations, along with forest reserves set aside under the authority of
the General Land Law Revision Act of 1891 by Presidents Harrison and Cleveland, were reserved
before the state of Utah was admitted to the Union in 1896. See Robert D. Baker et. al., Timeless
Heritage: A History of the Forest Service in the Southwest 55 (1988), www.fs.usda.gov/
Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5438144.pdf (retracing the history of forest reservations and
explaining the role of Presidents Harrison, Cleveland and McKinley). So the notion that Utah could not
reasonably anticipate federal land reservations at the time of statehood is inconsistent with the historical
record.
119. John Gratiot’s argument that the Property Clause authorized the government only to sell
public lands is the main claim asserted by the Bundy movement. See Jenny Rowland, The Bundy Legal
Defense: Feds Have No Jurisdiction Over Federal Lands, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://thinkprogress.org/the-bundy-legal-defense-feds-have-no-jurisdiction-over-federal-landsa48d09b5884b#.bqsg29flc.
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the lands for sale.120 He therefore maintained that leasing public lands
constituted an unlawful exercise of congressional power under the Property
Clause.121 Resolving a divided lower court decision, the Supreme Court
rejected Gratiot’s argument and decided that Congress had the constitutional
authority to dispose of federal property any way it wished, including leasing
lead mines.122 According to the 1840 Court, federal authority over public lands
was “without limitation.”123
A long line of Court decisions repeated this language. The Gratiot
decision upheld the essentially unreviewable discretion of Congress to lease,
sell, or maintain federal lands. The Court added that the state of Illinois could
not “claim a right to the public lands within her limits,”124 so the federal
Property Clause power remained unaffected by statehood.125
Over a century later, in United States v. City of San Francisco, the
Supreme Court considered the legality of a conditional transfer of interests in
federal lands.126 Congress conveyed public lands to the city for electricity use
on the condition that the municipality would sell the electricity directly to the
city residents, not to a monopolistic private utility.127 The city challenged those
conditions as beyond the power of Congress.128 The district court enjoined the
city from selling power to Pacific Gas and Electric, a private utility. 129 The
Supreme Court affirmed, reiterating that Congress’s Property Clause powers
were “without limitations,” and declaring that the Property Clause permitted
“an exercise of the complete power which Congress has over particular public
property entrusted to it.”130 The Court therefore upheld the conditional transfer
of land that forbade the monopolization of hydropower produced on federal
lands, illustrating the plenary power of the federal government to manage
public lands for the “benefit of the people.”131

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Gratiot, 39 U.S. at 531–32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.
Of course, states obtained many lands (and incurred several obligations) in their statehood
acts, aimed at providing lands for public schools, veterans, state buildings, penitentiaries, and
universities. See, e.g., Oregon Statehood Act, ch. 33, § 4, 11 Stat. 383, 383–84 (1859); see also North
Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington Statehood Acts, ch. 180, §§ 10–18, 25 Stat. 676, 679–
82 (1889).
126. 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
127. Id. at 18–19.
128. Id. at 19.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 29, 30. The court noted that Congress’s Property Clause powers did not entail a federal
general police power. See id. at 30.
131. Id. at 23 (quoting the legislative history of the bill at issue).
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2. Managing Federal Lands
In Camfield v. United States, the first post-Civil War Property Clause case
decided by the Supreme Court, Daniel Camfield tried to fence in approximately
20,000 acres of public lands in Colorado.132 Although he did not technically
fence public land (made illegal by the Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act
of 1885),133 Camfield did fence his checkerboarded private lands in such a way
as to enclose adjacent public lands as well.134 At the federal government’s
request, a lower court enjoined erection of the fence.135 The court of appeals
affirmed, and so did a unanimous Supreme Court.136
The Court determined that the federal government not only possessed
proprietary powers over its own lands, it also held sovereign powers, enabling
it to order the removal of fences on private land because they interfered with
congressional policy established by the Unlawful Inclosures Act. 137 In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Brown declared that the “government doubtless
has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several
states, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is
measured by the exigencies of the particular case.”138 Under Camfield, the
federal government can employ its authority as a landowner to manage uses on
its lands as it sees fit; it may also invoke its sovereign powers to regulate
activities on private lands adversely affecting public lands. The Court declared
that “[a] different rule would place the public domain of the United States
completely at the mercy of state legislation.”139
Two decades after Camfield, in United States. v. Grimaud,140 grazers on
the federal Sierra Forest Reserve in southern California challenged the
authority of the Forest Service to regulate their grazing and charge them for
their use of public lands. Pierre Grimaud claimed that the management of the
reserve by the Forest Service amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.141 He therefore alleged that requiring grazing permits and
fees was unlawful.142 The district court ruled in favor of Grimaud, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion
by Justice Joseph Lamar.143 The Court upheld as a permissible delegation of

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

167 U.S. 518, 519 (1897).
Ch. 149, 23 Stat. 321 (1885) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061–1066 (2012)).
Camfield, 167 U.S. at 519.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 526.
220 U.S. 506, 514 (1911).
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id. at 523. According to the leading casebook, Grimaud was a “remarkable” decision, because
the Court originally affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of Grimaud on a 4-4 vote. But the Court
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legislative power144 the Agriculture Secretary’s authority under the Organic
Administration Act145 to establish and enforce administrative rules in order to
“insure [protection of] the objects of such reservation.”146 Thus, the delegation
of authority to the Forest Service to manage national forests remained well
within Congress’s powers under the Property Clause.147
The same day that it decided Grimaud, the Court also handed down Light
v. United States,148 a case involving a Colorado grazer who allowed his cattle
to graze next to federal land. When the cattle roamed onto the public land, he
declined to remove them and—in a claim resembling those raised by the Bundy
confrontations—argued that the government could not require him to prevent
his cattle from using the adjacent federal land unless the government fenced the
forest reserve.149 Fred Light relied on Colorado state law requiring a landowner
to fence his land in order to recover damages for trespass.150 The lower court
found for the government and enjoined Light from cattle trespass on federal
lands.151
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Colorado’s fence laws were not
a justification for trespassing on the public domain.152 Citing Buford v.
Houtz,153 the Court declared that the implied consent to roam on unfenced
lands under Colorado law conferred no vested rights, and that the federal
government retained the power to recall any implied license Light may have
enjoyed.154 Justice Lamar declared that “[t]he United States can prohibit
absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be used. As it can
withhold or reserve the land, it can do so indefinitely.”155 Light and Grimaud
settled the constitutionality of the 1897 Organic Administration Act governing
national forest lands and reaffirmed broad congressional power to manage
federal lands under the Property Clause, including the ability to preempt
conflicting state laws.156
The Court’s next encounter with the Property Clause occurred in the 1917
case of Utah Power and Light v. United States, which concerned a utility’s
then proceeded to grant the federal government’s petition for rehearing, and a year later reversed without
a dissent. See Coggins, et al, supra note 16, at 118.
144. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 521.
145. Ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (1897) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
146. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 515; 30 Stat. at 35 (codified as amended at 16. U.S.C. § 551 (2012)).
147. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 521.
148. 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911).
149. Id. (Light claimed that “unless the government put a fence around the reserve, it had no
remedy, either at law or in equity, nor could he be required to prevent his cattle straying upon the
reserve from the open public land on which he had a right to turn them loose.”).
150. Id. at 526.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 537.
153. 133 U.S. 320 (1890) (declaring that public-lands grazers had an implied license to roam on
unfenced public lands).
154. Light, 220 U.S. at 535.
155. Id. at 536.
156. Id. at 537–38; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 523 (1911).
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unpermitted electric facilities on national forest land.157 Utah Power contended
that since the land was never ceded to the federal government under the
Enclave Clause, only state law governed.158 The lower court ruled against the
utility, and a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by Justice Van
Devanter, who wrote that “the power of Congress is exclusive and that only
through its exercise in some form can rights in lands belonging to the U.S. be
acquired.”159 The Court reiterated the notion first expressed in Camfield that
the federal government would be at the mercy of state legislation without this
exclusive power.160 Justice Van Devanter declared that “state laws, including
those relating to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, have no bearing
upon a controversy such as here presented.”161 Thus, as first established in
Light, state laws may be preempted on federal land.162
Decisions like Camfield, Grimaud, Light, and Utah Power made clear that
the inclusion of federal lands within state boundaries did not undermine the
federal power to control occupancy and use of public lands. 163 Instead, the
federal government retained plenary authority to protect its lands from trespass
and injury and to prescribe the conditions upon which users may obtain rights
in these federal lands.
3. Protecting Federal Lands
Kleppe v. New Mexico,164 the most important recent Property Clause case,
considered the power of Congress under the Property Clause to protect wildlife
on federal lands when doing so conflicted with state laws. The dispute began
when a public-land grazer invoked the New Mexico Estray Law to round up
wild horses near a water source and sell them.165 The federal Wild FreeRoaming Horses and Burros Act166 protected the horses and required the grazer

157.
158.

243 U.S. 389 (1917).
See id. at 403. The Enclave Clause provides for federal authority over the District of
Columbia and other federal enclaves; states must consent for the Enclave Clause to apply on their
territory. See Appel, supra note 25, at 4 n.15.
159. Utah Power, 243 U.S. at 404. Justice Van Devanter was well-equipped to discuss the power
of Congress under the Property Clause, given his experience as assistant attorney general assigned to the
Department of Interior in Washington, D.C. See Lori Van Pelt, Willis Van Devanter, Cheyenne Lawyer
and U.S. Supreme Court Justice, WYO. STATE HISTORICAL SOC’Y, http://www.wyohistory.org/
encyclopedia/willis-van-devanter-cheyenne-lawyer-and-us-supreme-court-justice (last visited Mar. 31,
2016).
160. Utah Power, 243 U.S. at 405.
161. Id.
162. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 532 (1911).
163. See 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (authorizing the Forest Service to regulate “occupancy and use”
of national forest land); United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1940) (upholding
the federal government’s grant to allow San Francisco to generate electricity on the condition that only a
public utility could sell that electricity).
164. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
165. Id. at 533.
166. Pub. L. No. 92–195 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2012)).
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to notify BLM if they were interfering with his cattle.167 When BLM refused to
allow an auction sale of the horses, the state sued, challenging the
constitutionality of the federal statute.168 The lower court declared the Act
unconstitutional and enjoined the federal government from enforcing it,
deciding that the wild animals did not become federal property by merely being
on federal land; therefore, the government could not regulate them. 169
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, upholding the constitutionality
of the Wild Horses Act as a “needful regulation ‘respecting’ the public
lands,”170 and deferring to Congress’s determination of what constituted a
“needful regulation.”171 The Court also upheld the congressional finding that
the horses were an integral part of the natural system of the public lands,172
expressly rejecting the state’s argument that the Enclave Clause limited the
government’s authority under the Property Clause.173 Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s opinion noted that even if a state retained jurisdiction over federal
lands within its territory under the Enclave Clause, Congress retained the power
under the Property Clause to enact legislation affecting federal lands. 174 In case
of conflict with state law, the federal legislation prevailed under the Supremacy
Clause.175 Finally, the Kleppe Court qualified its previous holding in Geer v.
Connecticut, which upheld broad state power over the taking and possession of
wildlife under the “state ownership” doctrine,176 rejecting the argument that

167.
168.

16 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012).
Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 534. An auction of the wild horses would most likely be won by
slaughterhouses wishing to sell horsemeat in dog food.
169. See id. (discussing the district court decision).
170. Id. at 536.
171. Id. (such a determination should be “entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress”).
172. See 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“Congress finds and declares that wild free-roaming horses and
burros are living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the West; that they contribute to the
diversity of life forms within the Nation and enrich the lives of the American people; and that these
horses and burros are fast disappearing from the American scene. It is the policy of Congress that wild
free-roaming horses and burros shall be protected from capture, branding, harassment, or death; and to
accomplish this they are to be considered in the area where presently found, as an integral part of the
natural system of the public lands”).
173. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 541–43. The state argued that the Enclave Clause required that it consent
to federal jurisdiction before Congress could exercise its authority to manage the federal lands. Id.
However, the Court ruled that
while Congress can acquire exclusive or partial jurisdiction over lands within a State by the
State’s consent or cession [under the Enclave Clause], the presence or absence of such
jurisdiction has nothing to do with Congress’ powers under the Property Clause. Absent
consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its
territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting those
lands pursuant to the Property Clause.
Id. at 542-43.
174. Id. at 542.
175. Id. at 543 (“A different rule would place the public domain of the United States completely at
the mercy of state legislation.” (citing Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 526 (1897))).
176. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (upholding the state of Connecticut’s ban on outof-season, interstate transport of harvested wildlife on the ground that the state, as owner of the wildlife,
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state ownership of wildlife restricted Congress from enacting wildlife
legislation if it conflicted with state wildlife law. 177
Although Kleppe focused on regulation of nonfederal activity on federal
public lands, the opinion did suggest that federal authority over wild horses
extended to nonfederal lands.178 Following the case, lower courts consistently
reaffirmed broad Property Clause power.179 For example, in Minnesota v.
Block, the Eighth Circuit held that Congress’s power included regulation of
conduct off of public land that threatened the designated purpose of federal
lands.180 At least within a federal reservation, federal authority includes the
ability to impose restrictions on nonfederal lands reasonably related to
protecting both the purposes and authorized uses of the federal land.181
C. Congressional Interpretation of the Property Clause
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Congress gradually shifted
federal policy from privatizing public lands to managing them for conservation,
recreation, and other public uses.182 This subpart surveys some of the main
statutes that Congress enacted to promote these policies. As early as 1872,
Congress reserved public lands in the territories of Montana and Wyoming for
what would become the nation’s first national park “as a public park or
pleasuring-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people.”183 Congress
could regulate its harvest and transport); see Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in
Wildlife, 2013 Utah L. Rev. 1437, 1451–65 (discussing Geer).
177. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 545 (“The Act does not establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over the
public lands in New Mexico; it merely overrides the New Mexico Estray Law insofar as it attempts to
regulate federally protected animals. And that is but the necessary consequence of valid legislation
under the Property Clause.”). In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), the Court called it a
“fiction” that states own the wildlife. Id. at 337. Although Hughes did not affect states’ sovereign
ownership of wildlife, the Court declared that state ownership did not insulate states from discrimination
against interstate commerce: under the Commerce Clause, since federal law can expressly preempt state
wildlife laws. Id. at 335–36.
178. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 546 (“[I]t is clear that regulations under the Property Clause may have
some effect on private lands not otherwise under federal control.”).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Congressional power
to regulate federal land under the property clause is in no way limited to the regulation of land held
before ratification of the Constitution.”); Diamond Bar Cattle v. United States, 168 F.3d 1209, 1214
(10th Cir. 1999) (ruling that a state statute purporting to grant possessory grazing interests on national
forest land, provided no enforceable right against the federal government); United States v. Armstrong,
186 F.3d 1055, 1061 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding federal regulations restricting a tour boat business lying
outside of a national park because the business adversely affected neighboring federal lands).
180. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir. 1981).
181. Id. at 1250 (“[I]f Congress enacted the motorized use restrictions to protect the fundamental
purpose for which the BWCAW had been reserved, and if the restrictions in [the federal statute]
reasonably relate to that end, we must conclude that Congress acted within its constitutional
prerogative.”).
182. See GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW §
2:3 (2d ed. 2007); see also David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the
Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279, 283 (1982).
183. Yellowstone National Park Protection Act of 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (1872) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 21–40c (2012)); 16 U.S.C. § 21 (2012).
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directed the Interior Secretary to manage Yellowstone National Park, giving the
Interior Department a conservation mission for the first time. 184
Two decades after Yellowstone, Congress ushered in a new era when it
authorized the Executive to establish forest reserves under the General Revision
Act (or Forest Reserve Act) of 1891.185 The statute enabled the President to
create forest reserves by withdrawing public lands from settlement and private
appropriation, authority that would eventually establish reservation and
management as the dominant federal land policy instead of disposition. 186
In 1897 Congress supplied management directives for the forest reserves
in the so-called National Forest Organic Act, which the Court would broadly
interpret in its Grimaud, Light, and Utah Power decisions.187 After the transfer
of management of these forest reserves from the Department of the Interior to
the Department of Agriculture in 1905, the Forest Service became the
management agency for the National Forest System under the leadership of the
visionary Gifford Pinchot.188 In 1911 the Supreme Court interpreted the
Organic Act to establish the Forest Service as “trustee” of the national
forests.189
In the years following the 1872 reservation of Yellowstone, Congress set
aside other lands that would become national parks in 1916, when it enacted the
National Park Service Organic Act, establishing the National Park Service and
giving it management authority.190 Earlier, Congress also gave broad authority
to the President to designate national monuments in the Antiquities Act of
1906, many of which later became national parks.191
184. 16 U.S.C. § 22 (2012). Faced with difficulties in protecting the park, Congress called on the
War Secretary for assistance and, in 1886, the U.S. Army took charge of Yellowstone to enforce
regulations in the park and protect its resources from poachers and squatters. Birth of a National Park,
NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/historyculture/yellowstoneestablishment.htm (last
visited Apr. 6, 2016).
185. Ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891).
186. See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 182, § 2:16; Getches, supra note 182, at 313.
187. See supra notes 140–163 and accompanying text; National Forest Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2,
30 Stat. 34 (1897) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). The Act sought to protect
the forest from fire, preserve watersheds, and promote timber production. 16 U.S.C. §§ 551c, 563, 569
(2012); see also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707 (1978) (concluding that the primary
purposes of the Organic Act were to promote timber harvests and watershed protection).
188. See Managing Multiple Use on National Forests, 1905-1995, U.S. FOREST SERV.,
http://www.foresthistory.org/ASPNET/Publications/multiple_use/chap1.htm (last visited Mar. 12,
2016).
189. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911). (“All the public lands of the nation are held
in trust for the people of the whole country.” (citing United States v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137 U.S. 160
(1890))).
190. National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535; Hot Springs Reservation
Act, ch. 126, 16 Stat. 149 (1877); Yosemite Reservation Act, ch. 184, 13 Stat. 325 (1864).
191. American Antiquities Act of 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 431–433 (2012)). The Antiquities Act has been used by sixteen presidents. Congress has also
invoked the Act forty times. See The Antiquities Act, WILDERNESS SOC’Y, http://wilderness.org/
article/antiquities-act (last visited Mar. 12, 2016). The Antiquities Act has been under recent attack by
some lawmakers, including Rep. Don Young (R-Aka.), former Chair of the House Committee on
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The Park Service regulates the national parks and most national
monuments with the purpose of conserving the scenery, wildlife, and historic
resources to leave the reservations “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations.”192 Today, the National Park System comprises more than four
hundred different areas,193 illustrating the repeated use of Congress’s Property
Clause powers to manage and protect federal lands for public benefit.
After establishing a new framework to provide for the reservation of
public lands in national forests, parks, and similar areas for conservation
purposes, Congress turned its focus to more specific land-use activities,
principally out of concern over overexploitation of mineral resources. This
concern resulted in a policy shift in managing public lands containing oil. In
1909 President Taft withdrew oil lands in California and Wyoming to prevent
private mineral entry under the Mining Act.194 The government then filed suit
against Midwest Oil Company in the District Court for the District of
Wyoming, seeking to recover the reserved lands from mineral claimants and to

Transportation and Infrastructure, who introduced a bill in January 2015 to amend the Act to prevent the
president from designating any monument without congressional approval. See Claire Moser, New
Congress Begins Anti-Environment Attack with ‘No More National Parks’ Bill, THINK PROGRESS (Jan.
16, 2016), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/01/16/3612702/new-congress-no-more-national-parksbill/; see also the efforts of Rep. Rob Bishop (R-Utah), discussed infra note 285 and accompanying text.
In June 2016, the House Appropriations Committee approved an appropriation bill that would restrict
the President’s authority to designate national monuments. See Tiffany Stecker, Lawmakers Say
Spending
Bill
Rider
Threatens
Negotiations,
E&E
NEWS
(June
16,
2016),
http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2016/06/16/stories/1060038913. President Obama recently exercised his
Antiquities Act authority to designate three new national monuments in California in early 2016, putting
some 1.8 million acres of public lands into national monument status. See Mark Lander & Julie
Turkewitz, With 3 California Sites, Obama Nearly Doubles Public Land He’s Protected, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/us/obama-california-national-monument.html. In
the waning days of his tenure, Obama added Bear Ears (in Utah) and Gold Butte (Nevada) Monuments
and substantially expanded the Cascade Siskiyou Monument (in California and Oregon). See Nathan
Roth, Obama Designates Two New National Monuments in Nevada and Utah, NPR (Dec. 28, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/28/507314596/obama-designates-two-new-nationalmonuments-in-nevada-and-utah (describing the designations of Bear Ears and Gold Butte); see also
Obama Expands Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument, WASHINGTON TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/12/obama-expands-cascade-siskiyou-nationalmonument/. In all, Obama established or expanded 34 monuments, breaking the record of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, who established or expanded 32 monuments.
192. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2012).
193. See About Us, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/index.htm (last visited Mar.
9, 2016).
194. See Taft’s Withdrawal of Oil Land Upheld by Supreme Court Federal Judges Declare
Exceutive [sic] Orders Are Legal Because of Assent by Congress, Sacramento Union (Feb. 24, 1915),
https://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=d&d=SU19150224.2.20. Under the 1872 Mining Law, miners could
enter public land to prospect for mineral deposits. A discovery of a “valuable mineral” entitled them to
ownership of the minerals. See generally COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 182, § 42:4. After
discovery, the government would have had to “buy back” any oil on such claims, even if it had not been
extracted, until the Mineral Leasing Law of 1920 was passed to disqualify oil and gas from staking
claims. See id. § 39:2.
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obtain accounting of oil extracted after the withdrawal. 195 After the lower court
dismissed the suit, the government appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which
certified certain questions to the Supreme Court.196 The Court upheld the oil
withdrawals in 1915 in United States v. Midwest Oil Company, citing
longstanding congressional acquiescence to executive-branch land
withdrawals.197 Five years later, the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 withdrew
fuel minerals like oil, gas, and coal from the 1872 law and authorized leasing,
with the federal government retaining title to the leased lands.198
The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934199 marked a major shift toward land
retention and conservation, effectively ending the disposition era.200 In the
1920s and early 1930s, unreserved western lands suffered large-scale
degradation from excessive grazing and drought, prompting Congress to enact
the Taylor Act to “stop injury to the public grazing lands by preventing
overgrazing and soil deterioration [and] to provide for their orderly use,
improvement, and development.”201 The statute reflected congressional
awareness of the unsustainability of unregulated grazing practices and
established the Grazing Service in the Interior Department, later combined with
the General Land Office to form BLM in 1946.202 The federal government
proceeded to issue grazing permits on some 16 million acres of public lands
under ten-year leases from 1934 to 1968.203 In the 1960s, new BLM
regulations recognized a “multiple-use management” policy. 204 This policy
committed BLM to more active management, but Congress did not
permanently codify multiple-use management205 until the enactment of the

195. The controversy over the oil land withdrawals led Congress to pass the Pickett Act of 1910
giving the President authority to withdraw lands for “public purposes to be specified in the orders of
withdrawals.” Pickett Act of 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (1910). The Pickett Act contained an exception
for “metalliferous” substances. See Getches, supra note 182, at 294.
196. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 468 (1915).
197. Id. at 469–71.
198. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 181,
201–263 (2012)). See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 182, §§ 39:2, 42:7. Under the Act, the federal
lessor benefits from payments of rents, bonus bids, and royalties. § 17, 41 Stat. at 443. The Act also
contained several conservation measures; for example, (1) prohibiting the filling of a well within 200
feet of the exterior boundary of the permitted or leased area, and (2) requiring each lease to be
conditioned on prevention of waste of oil or gas. § 16, 41 Stat. at 443.
199. Ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269.
200. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 16, at 96.
201. See The Taylor Grazing Act, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wy/st/en/
field_offices/Casper/range/taylor.print.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
202. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 16, at 26.
203. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 201.
204. See id. Multiple use management had been a hallmark of the Forest Service from its
inception, later codified by Congress in the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960).
205. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT FEDERAL COAL
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 5-207 (1979). Congress enacted a temporary multiple-use directive for BLM
in the Classification and Multiple-Use Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat. 986 (1964).
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Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA),206 which made
permanent BLM’s multiple-use directives and established comprehensive
planning as the chief characteristic of BLM land management.
Congress enacted FLPMA after a lengthy process initiated by completion
of the Public Land Law Review Commission’s final report in 1970.207 FLPMA
articulated BLM’s management responsibilities 208 and established the
fundamental policy that:
[T]he public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of
scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and
atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that, where
appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural
condition; that will provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife. . . .209

FLPMA granted broad authority to BLM to manage public lands,
formalized multiple-use, sustained yield management, and established
environmental protection as a purpose of public-land management. 210 The
statute expressly recognized the priority of protecting lands with high
environmental value for public benefit.211
With the enactment of FLPMA, Congress largely completed a
comprehensive framework to conserve and manage resources on public lands to
preserve parks, forests, grazing lands, and surface and subsurface resources.212
Federal management of public lands for the benefit of the people is thus a wellsettled national policy, a reflection of the overwhelmingly shared concern for
the protection and sound management of publicly-owned lands and natural
resources. The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Executive Branch all have
clearly and broadly interpreted the power to manage federal lands under the
Property Clause.

206. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, PL 94–579, 90 Stat 2743 (1976) (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785 (2012)).
207. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS (1970), https://ia802703.us.archive.org/10/items/onethirdofnation
3431unit/onethirdofnation3431unit.pdf.
208. FLPMA is sometimes referred as the BLM Organic Act. See The Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976: How the Stage Was Set for BLM’s “Organic Act”, BUREAU OF
LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/flpma/organic.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).
209. FLPMA § 102 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (2012).
210. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 208. FLPMA required BLM to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of public lands, § 302 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b)),
and called for designation of wilderness study areas, § 603 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1782).
211. FLPMA gave priority to BLM’s designation of “areas of critical environmental concern.” §
201 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a)).
212. Congress added to this framework the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 668dd–668ee (2012)),
establishing a statutory goal of conserving national wildlife refuges and defined conservation in
ecological terms. See Robert L. Fischman, The Significance of National Wildlife Refuges in the
Development of U.S. Conservation Policy, 21 J. OF LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 16 (2005). The statute
aimed to establish a national system of refuges, calling for the preservation of biodiversity as a
management goal, while recognizing hunting as a second-priority recreational use. See id.
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THE DISCONTENTS’ LEGAL CLAIMS

The anti-environmental movement called the “Sagebrush Rebellion”
began in the 1970s, mostly growing out of unhappiness among grazers and
some states with the decision in NRDC v. Morton.213 That decision ordered
BLM to prepare Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) on its land-use plans,
which threatened grazing restrictions. 214 The then-director of the Utah BLM
office predicted in 1980 that the legal uncertainty caused by the rebellion would
“bring all actions on public lands to a halt for ten years.”215 When the Reagan
Administration (led by a self-proclaimed sagebrush rebel) took office, newly
appointed Interior Secretary James Watt questioned the science underlying the
EISs and stated that he would always “err on the side of public use versus
preservation.”216 He refused to accept any grazing restrictions based on the
EISs, a position upheld in NRDC v. Hodel, which approved a BLM land plan
that largely ignored the need to improve degraded public rangeland through
grazing restrictions.217 As a result, there was no definitive legal ruling on the
rebels’ claims that the federal government lacked authority to cut back grazing,
although the decisions in Kleppe v. New Mexico218 (on the scope of the
Property Clause power) and in Arizona v. California219 (limiting the equalfooting doctrine to submerged lands beneath navigable-in-fact waters at the
time of statehood) put the handwriting on the wall concerning those types of
claims.
The rebellion against federal authority resurfaced in the 1990s when
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt (from a ranching family) announced his
“rangeland reform” program, which called for more environmentally sensitive
public-land grazing.220 Grazers responded by filing suit in federal district court
213. 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974). On the origins and goals of the Sagebrush Rebellion, see
generally John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics, and Federal Lands, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980).
214. See Jonathan Thompson, The First Sagebrush Rebellion: What Sparked It and How It Ended,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/articles/a-look-back-at-the-first-sagebrushrebellion.
215. See Marjane Ambler, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Misdirected Dynamite, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS 2 (Feb. 22, 1980), http://s3.amazonaws.com/hcn-media/archive-pdf/1980_02_22.pdf. Although
the Sagebrush Rebellion mostly focused on suing the federal government and on legislative efforts, the
movement built the foundations for the Bundys to act in a more “physical” manner.
216. See George C. Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, “Nothing Beside Remains”: The Legal Legacy of
James G. Watt’s Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law and Policy, 17 B. C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 473, 489 (1989). Watt also described his mission as to “fight in the courts those
bureaucrats and no-growth advocates who create a challenge to individual liberty and economic
freedoms.” Elizabeth Drew, Reporter at Large: Secretary Watt, NEW YORKER, May 4, 1981, at 108.
217. 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985) (holding that BLM did not violate NEPA by choosing an
action before preparing an EIS), aff’d, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987).
218. 426 U.S. 529 (1976); see supra notes 164–171 and accompanying text.
219. 373 U.S. 546 (1963); see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
220. See Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 750 (2000) (unanimously upholding various
provisions of Secretary Babbitt’s rangeland reform program). See generally Scott Nicholl, The Death of
Rangeland Reform, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 47 (2006).
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in Nevada, arguing that the federal government lost title to lands of the state
when Nevada joined the Union.221 The grazers also argued that federal
ownership of 80 percent of land within the state unconstitutionally infringed on
the state’s police powers and violated the equal-footing doctrine by putting the
state at an economic disadvantage compared to other states.222 But the grazers’
equal footing, Tenth Amendment, and Statehood Act claims failed in the Ninth
Circuit.223 Undaunted, the grazers and the states have advanced new legal
theories, none of which has succeeded, as we explain below.
A. State Water Rights as a Limit on Federal Land Use Discretion
Western public-lands ranchers advanced another theory that their state
water rights on federal lands provide them with implied easements to graze on
public lands so their cattle can access the water. Although the argument has met
with some success in the lower courts, appellate courts have consistently
rejected it.224
The latest judicial rejection occurred early in 2016 when the Ninth Circuit
ruled in favor of the government against the estate of the late rancher Wayne
Hage in a trespass case.225 Hage and his son held a federal grazing permit until
1993, but failed to renew it properly.226 When they continued to graze cattle on
federal lands, the federal government sued in trespass.227 The district court
ruled for the Hages, concluding that their state water rights gave them an
easement by necessity for their cows to access the water on public lands.228
The Ninth Circuit summarily reversed,229 holding that “the ownership of
water rights has no effect on the requirement that a rancher obtain a grazing
permit.”230 The court relied on case law from both federal and Nevada state
courts in determining that “water rights do not include, as a matter of state law,
221.
222.
223.

United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1318–19.
See id. (declaring that equal footing does not give the states title to the public lands within
their boundaries; instead, it conveys to the states only lands submerged beneath navigable-in-fact waters
at statehood).
224. See Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148, 154 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding that ownership of
water rights implies a right-of-way on public lands but only for diversionary purposes); Diamond Bar
Cattle Co. v. United States, 168 F.3d 1209, 1214–15 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting ranchers’ argument that
state water rights gives them an appurtenant right to graze on federal lands); Colvin Cattle Co. v. United
States, 468 F.3d 803, 807–08 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argument that a federal land grazing right is
inherent in a state water right).
225. United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2016).
226. Id. at 715.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Sean Whaley, Nevada Ranching Family Loses Federal Lands Court Case, LAS VEGAS REV.J. (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada/nevada-ranching-family-loses-federallands-court-case. The court also took the unusual step of granting the federal government’s request that
the appeals court remove the district judge from the case, as he had demonstrated hostility to federal
officials, citing them for contempt. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d at 715.
230. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d at 717.
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an implicit, appurtenant grazing right on federal lands,” because the Taylor
Grazing Act preempted any such state rights.231 Both the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have now clearly rejected the argument that water rights perfected
under state law entitle ranchers to graze their cattle on federal land adjacent to a
water source.232
B. Public Grass as a Private Property Right
Ranchers have also argued for a kind of “labor theory of grass.” 233 They
maintain that, because their families have been grazing on public lands for a
long period of time, they acquired rights to the grass on those lands, even
though the Taylor Act clearly stipulated that federal grazing permits gave them
“no right, title, or interest” in public lands.234 The grazers’ argument resembles
the common-law doctrine of accession, which, according to a nearly centuryold account, “comprehends the case of one who by his labor and skill, has
created a new product out of another’s article.”235 Their claim would be based
on their cultivation of public land grass, which allegedly provides the dominant
value of the lands. But accession law is premised on private land ownership,
not land owned by the sovereign.236 Moreover, it is hardly clear that the chief
value of the public rangelands is grass devoted to livestock grazing, not the
wildlife and watershed values that grazing damages.
The grazer’s argument also founders on the fact that they have no
ownership to the land on which the grass grows, and the federal statute
authorizing their permits expressly denies them land rights.237 Courts have not
yet had the opportunity to consider the grazers’ “grass ownership” argument,
but they may soon. Using the accession-related common-law doctrine of
emblements,238 the grazers might argue that the grass is a crop that they
nurtured as tenants of a federal grazing permit, and that even after the
termination of a lease, they are entitled to the value of the grass they

231. Id. at 719 (relying on Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 807–08 (Fed. Cir.
2006) and Ansolabehere v. Laborde, 310 P.2d 842, 849–50 (Nev. 1957)).
232. Hage’s estate has appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court. See Juan Carlos
Rodriguez, Ranchers Seek 9th Circ. Stay of Grazing Trespass Ruling, LAW360 (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://www.law360.com/articles/787055/ranchers-seek-9th-circ-stay-of-grazing-trespass-ruling.
233. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27, 17 (Thomas P. Reardon ed.,
Liberal Arts Press 1952) (reasoning that “every man has a property in his own person . . . . The labor of
his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of
the state that Nature has provided, and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”).
234. Ch. 865, § 3, 48 Stat. 1269, 1270 (1934) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2012)).
235. See, e.g., Earl C. Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal Property, 22 COLUM. L. REV.
103 (1922).
236. See Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 465 (2009).
237. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
238. See Merrill, supra note 236, at 465.
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produced.239 However, the doctrine of emblements applies only to indefinite
lease terms,240 which federal grazing permits do not have. Moreover, the
grazers could, at best, obtain a remedy equaling the value of one season of
grass.
The grazers might also analogize their grass-ownership argument to what
the Supreme Court once referred to as “constituent elements of the land,”
concerning claims to minerals and timber in connection with an Indian
reservation in United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians.241 In that case, the
tribe sought compensation from the federal government for settling a different
tribe on part of the reservation in violation of its treaty. The government
acknowledged that it owed the Shoshone Tribe compensation but claimed the
valuation should not include the value of the land’s timber and minerals. 242 The
Court ruled against the government because it had it assured the tribe
“peaceable and unqualified possession of the land in perpetuity,” which
implicitly included minerals and timber as constituent elements of the land;
otherwise, the reservation would transfer little in the way of beneficial
interest.243
But the government made no similar promise to public-land grazers; in
fact, it clearly stated that grazing permits were at the discretion of the federal
government.244 Moreover, the Indian law rule of construing agreements with
the government in favor of the tribes245 does not apply to the public-land
grazing context, where a contrary interpretative rule favors the federal
government in disputes with its grantees.246 Finally, ranchers were never the
beneficiaries of a land reservation held by the government as a trustee for them,
as is the case with tribes.247 The federal government is not a trustee for public-

239. In the agricultural context of accession the common-law doctrine of emblements protects a
tenant’s right to harvest annual crops, provided the lease term is for an indefinite period. See Reeder v.
Sayre, 70 N.Y. 180 (1877) (recognizing the doctrine). If a tenant plants a crop, and the landowner
terminates his lease not due to tenant wrongdoing, the tenant can invoke the doctrine of emblements to
harvest the crop even after the termination of the lease. See Richard D. Boyle, Tenant Ownership Rights
to Crops and Improvements on Leased Property, http://www.scolaro.com/wp-content/uploads/TenantOwnership-Rights-to-Crops-and-Improvements-on-Leased-Property.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
240. See Jacob H. Rottkamp & Son, Inc. v. Wulforst Farms, LLC, 844 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct.
2007). The doctrine of emblements applies to annual crops only, not perennial crops, which are
considered part of the realty. See, e.g., Benson v. Morse, 109 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
241. 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
242. Id. at 116.
243. Id.
244. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2012).
245. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] (Nell Jessup Newton, et al.,
eds. 2012) [hereinafter COHEN HANDBOOK]; Richard B. Collins, Never Construed to Their Prejudice: In
Honor of David Getches, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2013).
246. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957) (applying the federal land law
canon resolving doubts concerning federal grants in favor of the federal government).
247. See COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 245, at § 17.01.
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land grazers; on the contrary, it holds public lands in trust for the entire U.S.
public.248
C. The Enclave Clause as a Limit on Federal Lands
Krisanne Hall, speaking on behalf of the grazers, has advanced the novel
theory that the federal government’s authority to own land covers only ten
square-miles from Washington, D.C. under the Enclave Clause.249 Her claim
overlooks more than a century of Enclave Clause case law, which has
uniformly interpreted the clause liberally. 250 For example, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the language “needful Buildings” in the clause to include
dams251 and a national park.252
The Enclave Clause has, moreover, never been interpreted to limit federal
authority under the Property Clause.253 Eleven western state attorneys general
recently agreed that that the former does not limit the latter.254 As discussed
above, the consistent judicial interpretation of the Property Clause is “without
limitation.”255
D. The Supreme Court’s Alleged Misinterpretation of the Property Clause
Ammon Bundy adopted a somewhat different approach from Hall’s
judicial review argument in his defense in the Malheur Refuge case.256
Although he acknowledged the judicial review power of the Supreme Court, he
argued that the federal government has no authority over that refuge, and that
248. See, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 26,
at 421–22 (citing other case law).
249. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17: Congress may “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever over [the District of Columbia] and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by
the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.”
250. See, e.g., Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885) (rejecting a claim that
Enclave Clause land—a military reservation in Kansas—was exempt from state taxation); Collins v.
Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528 (1938) (finding that the Enclave Clause “has not been
strictly construed”); Virginia v. Reno, 955 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Va. 1997), vacated for mootness by
122 F.3d 1060 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Enclave Clause does not diminish federal power under
the Property Clause).
251. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
252. See Collins, 304 U.S. 518 (concerning Yosemite National Park).
253. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917) (rejecting the
utility’s argument that state law should apply to its dam on national forest land because the state had
never ceded the land, stating: “[T]he inclusion within a state of lands of the United States does not take
from Congress the power to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass, and injury,
and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them, even though this may
involve the exercise in some measure of what commonly is known as the police power.”). For a recent
interpretation, see Reno, 955 F. Supp. at 579–80 (holding that the Enclave Clause does not diminish
federal power under the Property Clause).
254. See supra note 66 (discussing the 2016 report of the Western Attorneys General).
255. See supra notes 123–131 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 25.
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the Court’s two-hundred-year jurisprudence regarding the Property Clause
powers of the government should be overturned.257 Bundy rejected the
extensive case law described above in Part II and argued that the Constitution
“only intended to give broad federal power of property in Territories, as the
Founders contemplated the expansion westward.”258
Bundy’s argument relies on the use of “Territories” in the Enclave Clause,
rather than “territories” in the Property Clause.259 He contends that
“Territories,” as a proper noun, reflected the Founders’ intent to recognize
federal power only over territorial lands that existed at the time of the drafting
of the Constitution.260 Since Oregon was not a territory in 1787, Bundy claims
“once statehood occurred for Oregon, Congress lost the right to own the land
inside the state,” except for purposes of the Enclave Clause.261
Bundy’s contention that “Territories” versus “territories” or “lands” has
constitutional significance was considered and rejected by the Supreme Court
176 years ago in United States v. Gratiot.262 In 1840 the Court interpreted the
term “Territories” in the Property Clause as “equivalent to the word lands,”263
meaning that the government has jurisdiction over all public lands, not just
those “Territories” that existed at the time of the drafting of the Property Clause
in 1787. In fact, Bundy’s reasoning echoes Justice Taney’s discredited analysis
of the Property Clause in Dred Scott—that Congress lacked the authority to
establish rules for federal territories in the West that were not part of the Union
at the time of the Constitution.264 Thus, Bundy relies on the most reviled
decision in Supreme Court history as the only authority supporting his view. 265
257. See Lauren Fox, Bundy’s Extreme Legal Defense: Feds Have No Jurisdiction Over Federal
Lands, TPM (Apr. 25, 2016), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/bundy-lawyer-expected-to-saymalheur-was-not-fed-land. Bundy’s argument seemed self-contradictory. In his brief he acknowledged
that the federal government has “plenary power to manage, regulate, sell or dispose of public lands.” See
Defendant Ammon Bundy’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 6, United
Stated v. Bundy et al., No. 3:16-CR-00051 (D. Or. May 9, 2016) (No. 527). This concession implied that
the government may retain public lands indefinitely, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s
Jurisprudence that the power to manage public lands is “without limitation.” See supra notes 116, 123,
130, and accompanying text.
258. See Declaration of Defendant Ammon Bundy’s Unopposed Motion to Extend Deadline for
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at 2, United States v. Bundy et al., No. 3:16-CR-00051 (D.
Or. Apr. 22, 2016) (No. 453).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2–3.
262. 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840).
263. Id.
264. See supra note 116.
265. Justice Taney claimed that the Clause “does not speak of any territory, nor of Territories, but
uses language which, according to its legitimate meaning, points to a particular thing” to argue the term
“territory” could only refer to the area ceded by Virginia and New York and covered by the Northwest
Ordinance. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 436, 446–47 (1857) (emphasis in original); see also
Appel, supra note 25, at 46 (“Purely from an analysis of the legal reasoning, Taney’s opinion in Dred
Scott is disturbing. To reach his conclusion, Taney belittled the text of the Constitution and ignored or
misconstrued several key cases interpreting congressional power over the territories.”).
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Bundy’s argument also ignored the fact that the Supreme Court has
already upheld federal ownership of Malheur Refuge.266 In United States v.
Oregon, the federal government sued the state to quiet title to submerged lands
underlying three lakes within the Lake Malheur Reservation, established by
executive order in 1908.267 The Supreme Court upheld the executive order
establishing Lake Malheur as a bird reservation as within the authority of the
President.268 The Court also decided that the lakebeds were federally owned,
directly contrary to Bundy’s argument that once Oregon joined the Union, the
government lost the power to manage public lands in the state.269 Since the
lakes were non-navigable at the time of Oregon’s 1859 statehood, the state
never obtained title to the lakebeds under the equal-footing doctrine when it
joined the Union.270 Consequently, Bundy’s argument was not only
inconsistent with nearly two centuries of jurisprudence, but also contradicted a
Supreme Court decision affirming federal ownership of Malheur Wildlife
Refuge.
E. Utah’s “Equal Sovereignty” and “Equal Footing” Claims
In connection with Utah’s TPLA, a New Orleans firm hired by the state
suggested that the state might have a valid claim under the so-called “equal
sovereignty” and “equal footing” principles.271 The “equal sovereignty” idea is
essentially a restatement of political equal footing, which does not have a
proprietary dimension.272 The law firm argued that FLPMA, by reversing
almost two hundred years of public-land policy “from one of disposal to one of
near permanent retention,” constituted an infringement on Utah’s sovereignty
as compared to states that have fewer federal lands within their borders.273 The
firm suggested that the state might obtain a judicial declaration that the federal
government cannot forever retain the public lands within Utah’s borders.274
266.
267.

United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
See Establishing Lake Malheur Reservation in Oregon as Preserve and Breeding Ground for
Native Birds, Exec. Order No. 929 (1908). Malheur Lake is the principal reason for the refuges, as it
attracts birds along the Pacific Flyway.
268. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 10. The Court did so even though the reservation preceded the enactment
of the 1920 Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Id. at 9–10 (relying on the congressional acquiescence the Court
adopted in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469–75(1910)).
269. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 10.
270. See id. at 23–25.
271. See Wentz et al., supra note 24, at 2–3.
272. Id. at 2 (citing to Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2012), which held that the Voting
Rights Act was unconstitutional under the Equal Sovereignty Principle because it treated states as
unequal in sovereignty). On political equal footing, see infra text following note 274.
273. Wentz et al., supra note 24, at 2.
274. Id. The New Orleans firm working for the state tried to support this claim under what it called
a “compact theory,” arguing that the Utah Enabling Act was an offer accepted by Utah, thus creating a
compact. This compact allegedly created an implicit duty for the U.S. government to timely dispose of
the public lands within Utah’s borders. Id. at 3–4. Bundy briefly mentioned this argument in its brief.
See Defendant Ammon Bundy’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 30, United
Stated v. Bundy et al., No. 3:16-CR-00051 (D. Or. May 9, 2016) (No. 527). Although the New Orleans
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The firm’s recommendation seems premised on the idea that “equal
sovereignty” requires more than equal political sovereignty. All states enjoy the
latter: two senators, proportionate representation in the House of
Representatives, and electoral votes equal to the congressional representatives.
This political representation separates states from territories like Puerto Rico
and the seat of the federal government in the District of Columbia. But political
equal sovereignty has never meant equal proprietary holdings. Given the
numerous allocation difficulties such an interpretation would raise, it is quite
unlikely that a court would reinterpret political sovereignty to include equal
proprietary ownership.
The Supreme Court has rejected expanding the scope of state equalfooting claims many times. The Court’s 1845 decision in Pollard v. Hagan
decided that new states obtained ownership through an implicit federal transfer
of the beds of navigable waters at statehood.275 But in subsequent decisions the
Court firmly declined to expand the doctrine to offshore submerged lands276
and to lands above the high water mark.277 Moreover, all of the western states
specifically disclaimed ownership of the federal public lands within their
boundaries in their statehood acts.278 No court has ever suggested that these
disclaimers were unconstitutional or unenforceable.279
The discontents’ legal claims therefore have little prospect of judicial
success. They may, however, have more success in the political arena, to which
we turn in the next Part.
IV.

THE DISCONTENTS’ POLITICAL PROSPECTS

With little prospect of success in the courts, the discontents’ claims might
receive a more welcome reception in Congress, which has the constitutional
power to dispose of federal lands. This Part examines a bill advanced by
firm contended that the “compact theory” enjoyed “historical support,” the Utah Enabling Act actually
included a disclaimer of non-interference by the state. See infra note 319. The analysis cited no evidence
of “historical support” for continued disposition, and at the time of Utah statehood in 1896, the federal
government had already reserved Yellowstone and what would become Hot Springs National Parks, and
Congress had authorized the President to reserve forest lands. So, this argument—which amounts to
saying that a statehood act could restrain congressional authority under the Property Clause— actually
lacks “historical support.” The Western states attorneys general agree, see infra notes 301, 306.
275. 44 U.S. 212, 229 (1845) (finding ownership of navigable riverbeds necessary to give new
states equal footing with the original states).
276. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 36 (1947) (“[W]e are not persuaded to transplant the
Pollard rule of ownership as an incident of state sovereignty in relation to inland waters out into the soil
beneath the ocean, so much more a matter of national concern”).
277. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597 (1963) (holding that Pollard and other cases
involved only the shores of and lands beneath navigable waters, and cannot be understood as limiting
the broad powers of the government under the Property Clause).
278. See Paul Conable, Comment, Equal Footing, County Supremacy, and the Western Public
Lands, 26 ENVTL. L 1263, 1271 (1996).
279. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1320 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
disclaimer clause in Nevada’s statehood act is declaratory of the right already held by the United States
under the Constitution to administer its property, which is constitutional).
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Congressman Rob Bishop (R-Utah) that would authorize conveying public
lands from the federal government to the state of Utah.280 The Part also
explains a new generation of local planning ordinances, which could fuel
further political debate concerning the ability of local governments to control
nearby federal lands.
A. Congressman Bishop’s “Grand Settlement” in Utah
Congressman Bishop has been pushing for a so-called “grand settlement”
between Utah’s environmental groups, which wish to expand wilderness areas
in the state, and oil and gas interests, which seek to open federal lands for
fossil-fuel production.281 Bishop’s proposal resulted from negotiations among
local and national environmental groups, recreationalists, tribes, ranchers, oil
and gas companies, and county commissioners over lands in eastern Utah.282 In
January 2016, Bishop unveiled a draft bill that would designate a total of 4.3
million acres of new wilderness and national conservation areas, as well as 301
new miles of wild and scenic rivers.283 The bill would also authorize the
transfer of some federal land to the state and designate other BLM lands as
priority areas for oil and gas development, grazing, and motorized vehicle
use.284 Although the Western Energy Alliance (representing some 450 oil and
gas companies) called the bill an “important milestone,” environmental groups
described the bill as worse than the status quo because it contained many
loopholes allowing activities usually prohibited in wilderness areas and
wilderness study areas.285
The Bishop bill would also curb the authority of the President to designate
national monuments under the Antiquities Act without congressional
approval,286 a provision that likely would have engendered an Obama veto.287
280. See Krista Langlois, Bishop’s ‘Grand Bargain’ in Utah Is No Deal, Say Enviros, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/issues/48.3/the-failed-compromises-of-rep-robbishops-public-lands-masterplan.
281. See Greg Hanscom, New Route to End Utah’s Wilderness Stalemate, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(July 29, 2013), https://www.hcn.org/issues/45.12/eastern-utahs-wilderness-stalemate?b_start:int/=0#
body.
282. See Langlois, supra note 280.
283. See id.
284. See Draft Bill to Provide Greater Certainty and Local Management of Federal Land Use in
Utah, and for Other Purposes, Title XI, § 1101 (Jan. 20, 2015), http://robbishop.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/discussion_draft_20jan16.pdf.
285. The bill would sanction motorized equipment and authorize new water-storage facilities in
new wilderness areas. It would also allow the state to conduct predator control, including aerial
shooting, and would forbid land managers from reducing livestock numbers as a response to drought.
See Langlois, supra note 280.
286. Title XIII of the draft bill, entitled “Long-Term Land Use Certainty,” was left blank, expected
to host the provision limiting the president’s powers under the Antiquities Act. Bishop warned President
Obama at a hearing with the White House’s Director of the Council on Environmental Quality that
“[t]he broad and frequent application of the Antiquities Act raises questions about the lack of
transparency and consultation with local stakeholders.” See Michael Lehr, Public Land Fight in Utah:
Will the President Designate Bears Ears a National Monument, COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L.: FIELD
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This attempt at a “grand bargain”—trading modified wilderness designations
for state control of oil and gas development—may gain political support in the
wake of the 2016 election that united all branches of the federal government
under Republican control.288
B. Local Land Planning Ordinances
Local governments can have an important effect on public-land
management. The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and FLPMA both
call for coordination of state and local plans in federal land plans.289 Some
local ordinances have interpreted the term “coordination” to mean governmentto-government negotiations on virtually all land uses.290 However, local
governments have long assumed that federal-land management was outside the
scope of community concern.291 Recently, however, the American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC) has drafted local ordinances challenging federal
control of public lands in the West.292 Encouraged by ALEC, some local

REPORTS 7 (May 5, 2016), http://www.columbiaenvironmentallaw.org/872-2/. The House Appropriation
Committee’s bill sent to the House that restricts the President’s authority to designate national
monuments was mainly motivated by a desire to prevent designation of Bears Ears as a national
monument. See Stecker, supra note 191.
287. See Langlois, supra note 280.
288. See id.; see also supra note 15 (discussing the 2016 Republican Party Platform); but see Kate
Sheppard, Sorry Republicans, Donald Trump Doesn’t Want to Sell Off Public Lands, Huffington Post
(July 21, 2016, 2:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/cramer-trump-public-lands_us_
57910d96e4b0bdddc4d393b3.
289. Under NFMA, the Forest Service must “develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land
and resource management plans for units of the National Forest System, coordinated with the land and
resource management planning processes of State and local governments and other Federal agencies.”
16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2012). FLPMA requires the Interior Secretary “to the extent consistent with the
laws governing the administration of the public lands, [to] coordinate the land use inventory, planning,
and management activities of or for such lands with . . . local governments within which the lands are
located.” 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2012).
290. See, e.g., PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL, HARNEY COUNTY’S BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO
COORDINATION 5 (Sept. 2012), http://www.co.harney.or.us/PDF_Files/County%20Court/public%20land
%20issues/Coordination%20Handbook%20-%20Public%20Lands%20Council%20-%202012.pdf.
291. See Michelle Bryan, Learning Both Directions: How Better Federal-Local Land Use
Collaboration Can Quiet the Call for Federal Lands Transfers, 76 MONT. L. REV 147, 148 (2015).
292. See Brendan Fischer, Rep. Grijalva Demands Federal Investigation into ALEC’s Role in NeoSagebrush Rebellion, PRWATCH (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2014/04/12451/
congressman-grijalva-requests-investigation-alecs-role-nv-range-fight; ALEC, Resolution Demanding
That Congress Convey Title of Federal Public Lands to the States, (Jan. 28, 2013),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/resolution-demanding-that-congress-convey-title-of-federal-publiclands-to-the-states/. ALEC bills fit into a broader pattern developing in the West: “Utah comes up with
these ideas, passes them into law through their legislature, and through the ALEC network, [legislators]
try and pass them in other states.” See Lyndsey Gilpin, How an East Coast Think Tank Is Fueling the
Land Transfer Movement, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/articles/how-aneast-coast-think-tank-is-fueling-the-land-transfer-movement (quoting Greg Zimmerman, the policy
director for the Center for Western Priorities).
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governments have enacted ordinances in an effort to obtain greater control over
federal public-land management.293
Although these sorts of local ordinances might not be enforceable,294 they
could inspire amendments to NFMA and FLPMA to make them enforceable.
When federal agencies’ decisions seem arbitrary to local populations, the
agencies may influence local governments to oppose federal-land planning and
regulation, and push for local ordinances to interfere with federal planning. The
feeling of distrust toward the federal government is catalyzed by the fact that
the decisions of a distant entity regarding wildlife protection, watershed
conservation, and management of other natural resources can affect the grazer’s
ability to manage land to which they feel entitled.295 Local visions of the public
interest in public-land management will likely reflect the heavy influence that
extractive industries can bring to bear on local communities due to the creation
of local employment and contributions to both local taxes and campaign
expenditures of local politicians.296 Although that vision would not be
consistent with national perception of the public interest, as reflected in statutes
like NFMA and FLPMA, local plans could influence Congress to change those
statutes. Prospects for success here seem much more likely than in any court
action.
CONCLUSION
The Malheur Refuge was an odd place for revolt against public-land
management because the local population generally accepted the refuge
management plan, evidenced by the fact that there was no appeal filed after the
plan’s promulgation.297 In fact, most of the occupiers of the wildlife refuge did
not even come from Oregon.298 Yet, the Bundys seized the opportunity
presented by the sentencing of two local ranchers to obtain publicity for their

293. See, e.g., BAKER COUNTY, OR., NATURAL RESOURCES PLAN (2015); see also Bryan, supra
note 291, at 149 (arguing that the growing involvement of the local communities is the product of a lack
of collaboration and inconsistent federal agency policies).
294. See Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 589 (1987) (deciding that state
environmental protection laws were enforceable on federal lands but state land use laws were not).
295. See Jes Burns & Tony Schick, Before Oregon’s Armed Takeover, a Long-brewing Dispute
Over Rangeland Health, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/what-isenvironmental-health-and-why-did-it-trigger-oregons-armed-takeover/;
see also
COGGINS &
GLICKSMAN, supra note 182, at § 1:23.
296. See Bruce Finley, Collapse of Colorado Coal Industry Leaves Mining Towns Unsure What’s
Next, DENVER POST (May 14, 2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/05/14/collapse-of-colorado-coalindustry-leaves-mining-towns-unsure-whats-next/.
297. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MALHEUR NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE COMPREHENSIVE
CONSERVATION PLAN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1, https://www.fws.gov/uploadedFiles/Region_1/NWRS/
Zone_2/Malheur/Documents/MalheurNWR_FCCP_Exec_Sum.pdf. See supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
298. Bryan M. Vance, Faces of the Malheur Refuge Occupation Trial, OPB NEWS (Sept. 1, 2016),
http://www.opb.org/news/series/burns-oregon-standoff-bundy-militia-news-updates/820regon820refuge-occupation-defendants-trial-status-criminal-case/.
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cause.299 Although Malheur was not the first confrontation of this kind, its
length and violence (including the death of one protester) raise broader
concerns in the fight opposing federal agencies’ efforts to protect and restore
areas of federal public lands for their recreational and ecological values. 300
The Malheur occupation represents only the latest of a long history of
unsuccessful opposition against the Constitution’s Property Clause. 301 This
opposition is not surprising given the deep feeling of distrust among some
westerners towards the federal government, a distant entity making decisions
affecting highly interested locals who usually favor commodity production over
water quality, wildlife habitat, and natural resource preservation. 302
The tension between these two competing interests—local interests versus
national interests—can now quickly escalate into highly mediatized armed
conflicts like the Malheur Refuge, due in large part to the outsized influence of
social media.303 However, discontents like the Bundys are misguided about the
legal merits of their opposition.304 Although some of those involved in the
Malheur occupation may still serve prison time,305 sympathizers of the Bundy
cause may have better prospects in the political arena, as Congress has broad
powers to dispose of public lands under two hundred years of consistent
Property Clause jurisprudence.306

299.
300.

See supra note 2.
See Les Zaitz, Oregon Standoff Spokesman Robert ‘LaVoy’ Finicum Killed, Bundys in
Custody After Shooting Near Burns, OREGONIAN (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.oregonlive.com/821regonstandoff/2016/01/bundys_in_custody_one_militant.html.
301. Utah’s latest effort to take public lands away from the federal government also seems ill
founded, as eleven attorneys general, including the Republican attorney general from Utah, recently
concluded that “Congress may retain ownership of public lands indefinitely.” ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
REPORT, supra note 66, at 16. The same report also found that the Enclave Clause did not limit the
scope of the Property Clause, id. at 2, 17–21, and that neither the equal footing nor the so-called equal
sovereignty doctrines required federal conveyance of public lands to the states. Id. at 2–3, 22–47.
302. See Burns & Schick, supra note 295; see also COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 182, at §
1:23. The Bundy standoff seems to have emboldened other discontents to take action, although they
remain unsuccessful. See Tay Wiles, Malheur Occupation Impacts Linger Throughout the West, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/articles/ammon-bundy-malheur-standoff-effectssagebrush-rebellion (reporting on similar conflicts in New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, and Nevada).
303. See Bever, supra note 9.
304. See supra Part III. Although a jury eventually acquitted seven defendants involved in the
Malheur occupation, this decision does not alter the legal analysis in this Article. But the decision may
reflect the political prospects of the discontents. See infra Postscript.
305. Although as the postscript to this Article indicates, Ammon Bundy and six other defendants
surprisingly were acquitted of a federal conspiracy charge in late 2016, others still face charges and will
go to trial in early 2017. Others pleaded guilty prior to the Bundy trial. See Courtney Sherwood & Kirk
Johnson, Bundy Brothers Acquitted in Takeover of Oregon Wildlife Refuge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/us/bundy-brothers-acquitted-in-takeover-of-oregon-wildliferefuge.html?_r=0.
306. See supra Part II. This broad authority was recently recognized in the report by eleven
western attorneys general. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 66, at 4–21 (concluding the
Property Clause empowers the federal government to indefinitely retain public lands in federal
ownership, and that the Enclave Clause imposes no limits on the Property Clause).
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Because federal lands have always been central to Americans’ vision of
their identity,307 Congress and the President should exercise great caution in
any reform of public-land-management policies.308 Divestiture would radically
change public-land law—even the Western states attorney generals agree309—
and is inconsistent with its long history of anti-monopoly policy, 310 and it
would surely engender great opposition and litigation.311
The Malheur Refuge standoff might not be the last of its kind in Oregon.
One might think of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s insight about possession
sinking into one’s being, the so-called “endowment effect” (or divestiture
aversion).312 This seems especially characteristic of the psychology of grazers
who have used federal lands for generations, even without any recognized land
ownership rights.
In any event, the disturbing confrontation that took place at the Malheur
Refuge shed light on an alleged lack of communication between federal
agencies and local populations. If more federal-local coordination is necessary,
armed insurrection by opportunistic ranchers like the Bundys, taking advantage
of a mediatized event to advance their personal agendas, is hardly the vehicle to
produce it. Nor is wholesale conveyance of federal lands, a position adopted by
the 2016 Republican Party platform.313 Gifting land to states that cannot afford
the burden of managing federal lands could lead to the privatization of a
common heritage possessed by all Americans.314 Improved cooperation
307. Public-lands retention was the great achievement of the Progressive Conservation Era. The
national park system the Progressives inaugurated is not only among the most popular federal programs
(although federal land reservations antedated the Progressives, reaching back to pre-constitutional
America, see supra note 118), it is also quite central to Americans’ vision of themselves. See, e.g.,
PETER COATES, NATURE: WESTERN ATTITUDES SINCE ANCIENT TIMES 108 (1998):
Nature was a vital cohesive force in a country that lacked the glue of ethnic, religious and
racial homogeneity. Reinforcing the shared commitment to republicanism, democracy and
free enterprise, a literal sense of common ground could mitigate the centrifugal tendencies of
heterogeneity. The fabled frontier thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner (1893), which rooted
American culture, character and intellect firmly in the unmodified nature that colonists
encountered on the frontier, represented the culmination of a way of thinking about nature as
a moral quality imbued with a redemptive virtue that rubbed off almost magically on those
who came into contact with it, metamorphosing Europeans into Americans.
308. See Spencer Sunshine, Gunning for Office: Oregon’s Patriot Movement and the May 2016
Primary, POL. RES. (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.politicalresearch.org/2016/04/19/gunning-for-officeoregons-patriot-movement-and-the-may-2016-primary/#sthash.kjJcBnVe.ryrI9rNI.dpbs.
309. See supra notes 66, 301, 306 and accompanying text.
310. See Blumm & Tebeau, supra note 29.
311. There might be limits imposed on the federal Property Clause power by the public trust
doctrine, assuming it constrains the federal government. See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 26.
312. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) (“It is in the
nature of man’s mind. A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether
property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act
and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it.”).
313. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
314. See Leslie Weldon, Deputy Chief, Nat’l Forest Sys., A Precious Heritage: Speech to the
American Wildlife Conservation Partners Meeting (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.fs.fed.us/
speeches/precious-heritage.
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between federal-land managers and local communities obviously would
promote a better means of addressing local concerns than the Bundys’ violent
insurrection.
Both of the major land-management statutes—FLPMA and NFMA—
require the federal agencies to coordinate with states and local governments.315
States and localities are more likely now than in the past to seek to enforce
those provisions. Some localities are even preparing land plans for federal lands
in their vicinity.316 Although limits exist as to what local plans can
accomplish,317 they will doubtless achieve more than the Bundys’ clumsy
effort at constitutional revolution.
In a larger sense, the Bundy occupation reflects a conflict between
concepts of land ownership and usufructuary rights,318 which only allow the
use of the land without altering or impairing it. Both are property rights, but
usufructuary rights—like federal grazing rights—can ripen into land ownership
only in unusual circumstances, none of which are present in the case of federalland grazing.319 Moreover, the general public has great affinity to the lands it
owns and uses, and therefore feels the endowment effect identified by Justice
Holmes no less strongly than public-land grazers.320 Both have expectations,
and the general public’s are much more widely possessed and more firmly
grounded in law and history.
Despite the lack of any colorable legal merit of the Bundy occupation, the
effort illustrates some political support for a revolution in federal public-land
management.321 Yet, before states launch serious efforts to de-federalize public
lands, they should consider whether they can afford to manage the lands and
continue the current subsidies afforded to users like grazers. 322 Grazers benefit
from low fees and federal programs like those supporting predator-control

315.
316.

See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., BAKER COUNTY, OR., NATURAL RESOURCES PLAN (2015), http://www.
bakercounty.org/commissioners/pdfs/Adopted_Natural_Resource_Plan_20160620C.pdf;
GRANT
COUNTY, OR., PUBLIC LANDS NATURAL RESOURCES PLAN (2015), https://www.documentcloud.org
/documents/2852061-Natural-Resources-Plan.html.
317. See supra note 294.
318. Usufructuary rights are use rights—like grazing, timber harvesting, or mining—on lands
owned by another.
319. See supra notes 235–248 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrines of accession,
emblements, and constituent elements of the land). Adverse possession, a state common law doctrine, is
inapplicable on federal lands. Every statehood act includes a disclaimer of state land applying to federal
lands. See, e.g., Utah Enabling Act, § 3, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894) (“[T]he people inhabiting said
proposed State do agree that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands
lying within the boundaries thereof”). Even if it applied, an adverse possession claim would founder
because federal grazing permits would defeat any claim of adversity—an essential element of a
successful adverse possession case. 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a)(n) (2012); see JOHN G. SPRANKLING &
RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 18 (2d ed. 2012).
320. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 281–288 and accompanying text; see infra Postscript.
322. See Bale, supra note 54.
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measures.323 Existing federal subsidies are perhaps unobjectionable if they
provide the public widespread benefits like maintaining water quality standards
and promoting watershed and wildlife protection, but the restraints that
accompany such measures are the root cause of the discontents’ dissatisfaction
with federal control.
Any serious measures to transfer federal public lands to the states must
also possess publicly enforceable conditions ensuring the continuation of those
public benefits and prohibitions against privatization or monopolization.324
Given recent evidence that many Western counties oppose land transfers to the
states,325 states should weigh whether such transfers actually further local
interests. But in the final analysis, given that even politically unpopular
designations of conservation units like Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument in southeastern Utah produced widespread economic benefits,326
the discontents’ political agenda should meet with congressional skepticism.
The long-term intergenerational costs of the loss of federal public-land rights
would clearly outweigh any short-term profits from state conveyancing or
privatization.
POSTSCRIPT
On October 27, 2016, while this article was in press, the jury in the
Malheur occupation case acquitted the occupants of a conspiracy to deprive
federal employees of their right to work and weapons charges. There’s no

323. See id.; see also Jim Caswell, Opinion, Keep Public Lands in Public Hands, IDAHO
STATESMAN (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.idahostatesman.com/opinion/readers-opinion/article
56933223.html; see also Rebecca Worby, In Wyoming, a Cautious Public Lands Victory, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 3, 2017, http://www.hcn.org/articles/in-wyoming-a-cautious-public-lands-victory
(last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (discussing the Wyoming Senate President’s dropping of a proposed state
constitutional amendment which would have facilitated federal land transfers to the state, opposed by a
coalition of sportsmen, recreationalists, and conservationists called “Keep It Public, Wyoming”). Two
days earlier, on February 1, Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah) withdrew his bill, H.R. 621, the "Disposal of
Excess Federal Lands Act of 2017," which would have called for the selling of some 3.3 million acres of
federal land across ten states. The reason for the withdrawal was opposition from hunters and
fishers. See Jennifer Yachnin, Under pressure, Chaffetz withdraws bill to sell 3.3M acres, Greenwire
(Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060049460/search?keyword=+Rep.+Jason+
Chaffetz+%28R-Utah%29 (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
324. Antimonopoly has been a cardinal principle of public-land law for centuries. See supra notes
29, 311 and accompanying text.
325. See Tay Wiles, Land Transfer Support, County by County, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (July 25,
2016), https://www.hcn.org/issues/48.12/battles-over-whether-to-support-the-american-lands-councilrage-on-county-by-county (identifying, preliminarily, about 15 counties in the 11 western states—
generally the more populous counties—opposing or not accepting the efforts of the American Lands
Council to generate support to transfer federal lands to the states).
326. See Phil Taylor, National Monuments: Grand Staircase-Escalante Winners and Losers,
GREENWIRE (July 14, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060040270 (citing the mayor of the town
of Escalante stating that the economic winners were businesses like hotels, campgrounds, and
restaurants in the booming town, while the losers were coal companies which proposed large-scale
mining of the area).
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assured way of knowing why the jury acquitted the occupants.327 Perhaps the
case was poorly prosecuted. Perhaps the government did a poor job of voir dire
in selecting the jury. Perhaps the jury instructions were flawed. Perhaps the jury
did not understand the law underpinning the government’s authority to own and
manage public lands. Perhaps the result was simply jury nullification of laws
the jury members did not like. There is a long history of jury nullification
dating back to the eighteenth century in pre-Revolutionary America. 328
Whatever the reason for the acquittal, the result of the case does nothing to
change the underlying law discussed in this article. But the result could foster
political momentum to encourage Congress to exercise its constitutional
authority under the Property Clause to dispose of federal public lands to states
or private entities. There may be some limits as to those lands which Congress
may dispose,329 but those limits are largely undefined.
The overriding lesson from the Malheur occupation may be that although
the underlying law clearly supports federal ownership of public lands, the
discontents’ claims have political resonance. Whether they have sufficient
political resonance to support congressional disposition is a question that will
be answered in the coming years. One would hope that the issue would be
debated openly and publicly by elected officials, not accomplished through
low-level congressional appropriation riders or other subterfuges. The
American people—all of the American public, not just those in close proximity
to the lands they hope to control—deserve to be involved in what would be an
historic change in the relationship that the American people have had with their
federal public lands.
Twelve days after the jury acquitted the Malheur defendants, Donald J.
Trump was elected the forty-fifth president of the United States. On December
13, 2016, the press reported that the president-elect chose Montana Republican
Congressman Ryan Zinke as Secretary of Interior after deciding against another
finalist for the position, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, a Republican

327. After the verdict, one juror explained that the jury did not think it could rely on the
defendants’ “defining actions” to convict them but instead to determine if “any agreement was made
with an illegal object in mind,” which the juror stated was “lost on the prosecution throughout.” That
juror suggested that the jury was influenced by the distinction that the defense lawyers drew between the
“‘effect’ of the occupation—which undoubtedly kept federal employees from doing their jobs—from the
‘intent’ of the occupiers,” noting that “[i]nference, while possibly compelling, proved to be insulting or
inadequate to 12 diversely situated people as a means to convict” because “[t]he air of triumphalism that
the prosecution brought was not lost on any of us, nor was it warranted given their burden of proof.” See
Maxine Bernstein, Juror: Prosecutors Failed to Prove ‘Intent,’ to Impede Federal Workers,
OREGONIAN (Oct. 29, 2016), http://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-standoff/2016/10/juror_4_prosecutors_
in_oregon.html (quoting from Juror 4, a college student at Marylhurst University, who thought the
government failed to prove the fundamental elements of the alleged conspiracy charge).
328. See, e.g., Zenger Trial, 17 How. St. Tr. 675, 706, 716, 722 (1735) (acquitting newspaper
publisher John Peter Zenger of libel because the accusations he published about Governor Crosby were
accurate).
329. See supra notes 26, 311 and accompanying text.
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Congressmen.330 The apparent reason for choosing Zinke over McMorris
Rodgers—who was favored by the Republican establishment—was due to the
influence of Donald J. Trump, Jr., who opposed her over her past support for
selling off federal public lands.331 Thus, the early indication is that the Trump
Administration will not favor large-scale parceling off of federal public lands to
Western states. Some conservationists hold out hope that Secretary Zinke will
become a public lands champion in the tradition of Teddy Roosevelt. 332

330. See Juliet Eilperin, Trump taps Montana congressman Ryan Zinke as interior secretary,
WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/
12/13/trump-taps-montana-congressman-ryan-zinke-as-interior-secretary/?utm_term=.20a70e6da3b5.
331. Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, McConnell Eyed Ryan Zinke for a Senate Seat. Donald
Trump Had Other Ideas, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/
us/politics/ryan-zinke-mitch-mcconnell-trump-cabinet.html?_r=0.
332. See Ryan Zinke, Guest Opinion: A Conservative Case for Conservation, BILLINGS GAZETTE
(April 24, 2016), http://billingsgazette.com/news/opinion/guest/guest-opinion-a-conservative-case-forconservation/article_d23e5f2a-609e-5413-af98-819d15d365aa.html (in which then-Congressman Zinke
drew a parallel to the conservation measures he supports and those supported by Roosevelt).
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online
companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu. Responses to
articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.ecologylawquarterly.org.
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